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**MARYLAND SECURITIES LTD**

**BRUNSWICK PLACE, MANCHESTER**

**CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT**

**MAY 2021**

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**MARYLAND SECURITIES LTD**

**BRUNSWICK PLACE, MANCHESTER**

**CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT**

**MAY 2021**

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## **1 INTRODUCTION**

### **1.1 Purpose of a Crime Impact Assessment**

1.1.1 Crime Prevention is a material consideration in the planning process. The National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) (2019) refers to crime in the context of healthy communities and well-designed places.

1.1.2 Chapter 8, Promoting healthy and safe communities, states that planning policies and decisions should aim to achieve healthy, inclusive and safe places which “are safe and accessible, so that crime and disorder, and the fear of crime, do not undermine the quality of life or community cohesion – for example, through the use of clear and legible pedestrian routes and high quality public space, which encourage the active and continual use of public areas” (paragraph 91).

1.1.3 Chapter 8 also states that, “planning policies and decisions should promote public safety and take into account wider security and defence requirements by:

- a) anticipating and addressing possible malicious threats and natural hazards, especially in locations where large numbers of people are expected to congregate. Policies for relevant areas (such as town centre and regeneration frameworks), and the layout and design of developments, should be informed by the most up-to-date information available from the police and other agencies about the nature of potential threats and their implications. This includes appropriate and proportionate steps that can be taken to reduce vulnerability, increase resilience and ensure public safety and security; and
- b) recognising and supporting development required for operational defence and security purposes, and ensuring that operational sites are not affected adversely by the impact of other development proposed in the area” (paragraph 95).

1.1.4 Chapter 12, Achieving well-designed places, reiterates that planning policies and decisions should ensure that developments “create places that are safe, inclusive and accessible and which promote health and well-being, with a high standard of amenity for existing and future users, and where crime and disorder, and the fear of crime, do not undermine the quality of life or community cohesion and resilience” (paragraph 127).

- 1.1.5 The accompanying National Planning Practice Guidance (NPPG) (Note 7.5) reiterates the government's intention that designing out crime and designing in community safety should be central to the planning and delivery of new development.
- 1.1.6 The Manchester City Council Core Strategy (July 2012) should also be taken into consideration, alongside other relevant local level publications, including the Guide to Development in Manchester Supplementary Planning Document (SPD) and Planning Guidance (PG) (adopted April 2007), and Manchester Residential Quality Guidance (Issue 01, March 2017).
- 1.1.7 The Core Strategy (July 2012) includes policies SP 1 - Spatial Principles and DM 1 - Development Management in relation to crime.
- 1.1.8 Chapter 8 of the Guide to Development in Manchester SPD and PG (adopted April 2007) provides advice relating to Community Safety and Crime Prevention.
- 1.1.9 The Crime and Disorder Act 1998, Section 17, states that police and local authorities have a duty to exercise their functions with regards to the effect on levels of crime and disorder. Crime and disorder issues must be considered by local planning authorities when making planning decisions.
- 1.1.10 A Crime Impact Statement (CIS) clearly demonstrates that the Applicant has considered what impact their proposal may have on the surrounding area. Maryland Securities Ltd has commissioned this assessment in support of a full planning application for a proposed residential-led regeneration of Brunswick Mill, Bradford Road, Manchester.
- 1.1.11 The proposal is for the redevelopment of the site for residential led development, including 277 No. residential units (Use Class C3) and 2,034sqm of commercial floorspace, with associated infrastructure and landscaping.
- 1.1.12 The proposed layout is shown on the Site Wide Development Plan Ground Level (Drawing no. L(--))000).
- 1.1.13 This CIS is produced by Wardell Armstrong; a multi-disciplinary consultancy which is independent of the design process. The authors of the report are Chartered Planners (MRTPI) with a number of years' experience preparing Crime Impact Statements for various developments in accordance with SBD guidance, and have a clear understanding of factors affecting security in relation to construction and the built environment. A number of the WA team are certificated for attendance at an appropriate Police Crime Prevention Academy training course.

1.1.14 This report should be read alongside the submitted Design and Access Statement, prepared by Hodder + Partners. The CIS includes information to:

- Consider crime issues in the vicinity of the proposed development site through analysis of available crime data as a basis for assessing potential risk;
- Assess the development proposal in terms of its likely effect on crime and disorder;
- Show how security considerations can influence the detailed design of the proposed development; and
- Explain the design solutions that will reduce the proposed development's vulnerability to crime, including:
  - Design, layout and spatial relationships;
  - Management and maintenance; and
  - Physical security measures.

1.1.15 This CIS has been composed in order to:

- Aid the applicant to adapt the proposed development to avoid/reduce the adverse effects of crime and disorder;
- Allow Manchester City Council to assess the information contained within this CIS in relation to the overall impact of the proposed development on the local and surrounding area; and
- Help to allay any public concerns about the proposed development which are often brought about by a lack of information.

1.1.16 This CIS has been written to analyse crime issues in order to account for these at the earliest opportunity i.e. prior to detailed design. As such, this ensures that the planning application reflects any potential issues identified.

## **2 THE SITE AND PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT**

### **2.1 General Description of Site and Surrounding Area**

- 2.1.1 The proposed site is located off Bradford Road, Manchester. The site is bounded by Bradford Road to the northwest, Ashton Canal to the southeast, and Beswick Street to the south. The north of the site is bounded by a vehicle repair shop and garage. The site lies approximately 2km north east of Manchester city centre, with a National Grid Reference of SJ 85847 98727.
- 2.1.2 To the northwest of the site lies an area of low-density residential land use. To the southeast of the site, beyond the Ashton Canal, lie both commercial and industrial premises.
- 2.1.3 The proposed development site is located on a site featuring the former Brunswick Mill, whose most recent use is for a range of tenants on short-term leases, including recording and rehearsal rooms. The southwest section of the site is currently fenced-off and unused; it contains piles of debris and made ground with some areas of hardstanding.
- 2.1.4 Bradford Road is served by the number 74, 76, 217, 703, 709 and 724 bus routes, with one stop bordering the site near the junction of Bradford Road and Halmore Road. The 74, 76 and 217 run from Woodhouses, Oldham and Ashton-under-Lyne/Droylsden, respectively, to Piccadilly Gardens. The 73 runs from Monsall to Abbey Hey, the 709 from New Islington to Moston, and the 724 from Moston to Chorlton upon Medlock.
- 2.1.5 Piccadilly and Victoria rail stations lie approximately 1.3km southwest and 1.8km west, respectively, of the site. Both rail stations can be accessed via Metrolink tram from Holt Town, which lies within a 10-minute walk of the site.

### **2.2 Site Visit**

- 2.2.1 Wardell Armstrong have undertaken a site and surrounding area walkover to supplement this Crime Impact Statement.
- 2.2.2 The nature of a site can be changed dramatically once it is developed. In this case, the brownfield site (currently vacant) will be transformed by residential development, and the Mill buildings will be renovated for use as a mix of commercial spaces on the ground and first floors, and residential units on the other floors.

2.2.3 The main benefit of a site walkover is to give an indication of potential crime risks during the site development/construction and operation stages given the characteristics of the surrounding areas and to highlight any mitigation measures that would be required as part of the proposed development.


2.2.4 As such, a walkover of the site and surrounding areas was undertaken on Tuesday 2 March 2021.



Photograph 1: Entrance to Brunswick Mill from the courtyard towards Bradford Road.



Photograph 2: Loose and missing bricks within the Brunswick Mill courtyard.



Photograph 3: Fire escape and façade within the Mill courtyard.



Photograph 4: Litter and graffiti within the Mill courtyard.



- 2.2.5 Photographs 1-4 show the courtyard of Brunswick Mill, access is gained from Bradford Road through a gated entrance (shown within Photograph 1). The courtyard features informal car parking with ground floor access to the mill buildings; surveillance cameras are present near the entrance, directed to view the internal courtyard space. A fire escape stairway scales the south-eastern elevation within the courtyard. Most windows within this space are boarded with some broken windowpanes.
- 2.2.6 There is evidence of damage to the brickwork on external walls within the courtyard (shown within Photograph 2), with some bricks missing and others dislodged, which could enable climbing. Graffiti is present on the courtyard walls; in addition, litter and drinks cans/bottles are present around the perimeter of the courtyard.
- 2.2.7 As a result of its enclosed nature and boarded internal windows, the courtyard has very little natural surveillance, both from internal and external surveillance.



Photograph 5: Debris piles and broken/boarded windows within the southwest section of the Site.



Photograph 6: Hardstanding, surveillance, fencing and entry points within the southwest section of the Site.



Photograph 7: Evidence of drug use within the southwest section of the Site.



Photograph 8: Made ground piles within the southwest section of the Site.

- 2.2.8 The southwest section of the site shown within Photographs 5-8 consists of a large open area containing hardstanding, made ground and debris piles. This area has three gated access points – two off Bradford Road and one off Beswick Street; each consists of metal gates secured with chain and padlocks and reinforced by metal sheets and barbed wire to prevent access. The northwest and southwest boundaries of the site are secured by high walls and metal fencing. The southeast boundary is secured by low plastic fencing which is falling into disrepair in some areas. Beyond this fencing is thick vegetation.
- 2.2.9 The northeast boundary of the area consists of the external mill wall (Photograph 5), against which are multiple debris piles consisting of plastic waste and wooden planks, in addition to general litter.
- 2.2.10 Towards the southwest of the site lies an area of hardstanding overlooked by CCTV surveillance cameras (shown within Picture 6 and 7). Some litter including food packaging waste is present alongside the perimeters of this area, and evidence of drug use was found.
- 2.2.11 The remainder of this open area is uneven with loose and compacted debris and made ground.



Photograph 9: Site boundary from Bradford Road.



Photograph 10: Site boundary on the corner of Beswick Street and Bradford Road.



Photograph 11: Site boundary fencing on Beswick Street.



Photograph 12: View southwest along Bradford Road.

2.2.12 Photographs 9-11 show the site boundary along Bradford Road and Beswick Street. All external windows are boarded, with some protected by mesh covers (as shown in Photograph 10). Litter was found along the road in addition to a discarded mattress. Graffiti is present on many of the ground-level boarded windows. The metal chain link fencing along Beswick Street is topped with barbed wire in some areas to discourage climbing. Some sections of this fencing show signs of damage, with evidence of past breaks in the fence that have since been repaired.

2.2.13 Photograph 12 shows the view southwest towards the site along Bradford Road. The pictured gated entrance is for an industrial property to the northeast of the site. The high walls and fences are topped with barbed wire, the gate is secured by a heavy chain and padlock.



Photograph 13: View along Bradford Road to the residential development to the north of the site.



Photograph 14: View to the northeast along Ridgway Street.



Photograph 15: Ongoing construction work on Halmore Road.



Photograph 16: View of open space and residential properties to the west of Butler Street

2.2.14 The site is bordered by a low-density residential area to the north (pictured within Photographs 13-16). Some small convenience shops and a community garden are located off Ridgway Street.

2.2.15 Construction of residential units is currently being undertaken along Halmore Road and Bradford Road, with Heras-style temporary fencing used to protect construction sites. Some litter was located along the pavements of this residential area, with more within alley ways and parking areas. The open area to the west of Butler Street contains a number of fenced and unfenced parking areas, green space and small earth bunds.



Photograph 17: View northeast from Beswick Street of Ashton Canal and the site boundary.



Photograph 18: Canal towpath access from Beswick Street.

2.2.16 Ashton Canal runs along the south-eastern site boundary, with the canal towpath bounding the site as shown within Photograph 17. Industrial premises lie to the southeast of the canal. Access to the canal towpath is gained from Beswick Street, pictured within Photograph 18. Graffiti along the walls bounding the paths is prevalent. No streetlighting was noted.



Photograph 19: External fencing and dense vegetation along the boundary of the site and canal towpath.



Photograph 20: Boarded windows and graffiti along the external walls of the mill buildings.



Photograph 21: Evidence of antisocial behaviour along the canal towpath alongside the site boundary.



Photograph 22: Covered windows of properties adjoining the canal, to the southwest of the site.

- 2.2.17 Photographs 19-21 were taken along the Ashton Canal towpath at the site boundary. Photograph 22 was also taken along the canal towpath and shows a property to the southwest of the site.
- 2.2.18 Secure fencing borders the southern perimeter of the open section of the site and canal towpath. This gives this area of the perimeter a double layer of fencing (internal plastic fencing described above and external palisade-style fencing), with thick vegetation between the two. All of the mill building's windows on the southeast-facing elevation are bricked up, with graffiti prevalent on most walls facing the canal. Properties also bordering the canal towpath have grilled protection placed over windows. Evidence of antisocial behaviour was noted along the canal towpath and site boundary near the access point from Beswick Street – drinks bottles and cans were found along with evidence of drug use.
- 2.2.19 The area to the south and east of Ashton Canal is largely occupied by large industrial and commercial properties in addition to some open space (pictured within Photographs 23-26). Boundary walls of properties within this area are largely topped with barbed wire to discourage intruders. Car parks within this area are enclosed by high palisade-style security fencing; however, at the time of the site visit there were also a large number of cars parked on the street. Windows of properties along Pollard Street were largely boarded, with graffiti present on many of the windows and boards (Photograph 25). Large piles of litter, including food packaging and drinks cans/bottles, were present against some areas of fencing and within vegetation bordering the road along Pollard Street (Photograph 26).



Photograph 23: Commercial properties on Piercy Street, to the south of Beswick Street.



Photograph 24: View of open space south from Beswick Street.



Photograph 25: Boarded windows of industrial and commercial premises looking northeast on Pollard Street.



Photograph 26: Litter and barbed fencing bordering industrial property on Pollard Street.

## 2.3 Proposed Development

- 2.3.1 The proposal is for the redevelopment of the site for residential led development, including 277 No. residential units (Use Class C3) and 2,034sqm of commercial floorspace, with associated infrastructure and landscaping.
- 2.3.2 The currently vacant brownfield site will be transformed by residential development, and the Mill buildings will be renovated for use as a mix of commercial spaces on the ground and first floors, and residential units on the other floors.
- 2.3.3 The proposed layout is shown on the Site Wide Development Plan Ground Level (Drawing no. L(--))000).

### 3 CRIME DATA ANALYSIS

#### 3.1 Crime Issues in the Vicinity of the Site

3.1.1 Table 3.1 below provides the crime incidents from July 2018 to June 2019 recorded by the police<sup>1</sup>. The data considers incidents within a 1-mile radius of the proposed development at Brunswick Mill, Bradford Road, Manchester.

3.1.2 Please note that typically data would be available for a more recent period; however, at the time of writing, the police.uk website has not been updated with 2020/21 data. Therefore, the raw data has been obtained from <https://data.police.uk/data/>. The data can be updated once available; however, it is not anticipated that this will change the findings.


Table 3.1 – Recorded Crime Incidents for July 2018 to June 2019													
Crime Type	Jul 18	Aug 18	Sep 18	Oct 18	Nov 18	Dec 18	Jan 19	Feb 19	Mar 19	Apr 19	May 19	Jun 19	TOTAL
Anti-Social Behaviour	162	188	165	193	192	62	168	211	221	220	215	204	2201
Bicycle theft	32	19	26	21	17	7	9	8	15	7	28	23	212
Burglary	61	32	50	61	54	27	41	47	42	45	34	27	521
Criminal damage and arson	56	63	67	69	84	46	60	67	50	68	63	76	769
Drugs	25	25	31	26	33	25	30	27	82	55	80	39	478
Other crime	8	9	11	11	6	9	5	5	8	13	11	14	110
Other Theft	117	109	88	92	83	96	87	94	94	93	81	96	1130
Possession of Weapons	9	6	8	7	9	4	7	9	10	7	19	8	103
Public order	137	110	164	110	125	84	82	100	124	137	97	97	1367
Robbery	46	52	53	60	56	25	37	27	29	34	33	27	479
Shoplifting	23	19	27	20	20	22	20	27	32	26	25	24	285
Theft from the person	62	68	65	77	64	64	44	55	77	73	60	111	820

<sup>1</sup> Crime Incidents data from the police website: Greater Manchester Police crime statistics for 2018-2019 accessed from <http://police.uk> in October 2020.

<b>Vehicle Crime</b>	82	89	118	126	151	115	116	117	132	126	121	126	<b>1419</b>
<b>Violence and sexual offences</b>	224	187	213	201	193	191	177	182	185	189	215	256	<b>2413</b>
<b>TOTAL Crime</b>	1044	976	1086	1074	1087	777	883	976	1101	1093	1082	1128	<b>12307</b>

3.1.3 From the above, it can be ascertained that the proposed development may be subject to a number of potential crime incidents, which are typical of those detailed in Table 3.1. As such, the site, machinery and partly constructed dwellings may be vulnerable to criminal damage during the construction period. Therefore, the development site management strategy should provide details of security measures to mitigate against this potential for crime.

3.1.4 As illustrated in Figure 3.1, below, the largest components of the reported incidents within the locality by a great margin are violence and sexual offences (2,413), and antisocial behaviour (2,201). There have also been significant numbers of incidents recorded for each of public order, vehicle crime, theft, and criminal damage and arson offences.



**Figure 3.1 – Recorded Crime Incidents by Type, July 2018 to June 2019**



- 3.1.5 As the most prevalent criminal acts in the area, antisocial behaviour and violence and sexual offences could spread from other areas around the site and impact on the residents and users of the new development. Dwellings may be at risk of experiencing burglary, criminal damage and arson, and cars may be at risk of vehicle crime. The proposed design is reviewed and analysed in Section 4, below, to ensure that potential crime vulnerability is considered at an early stage in the design process.
- 3.1.6 The police.uk website does not state the Greater Manchester Police (GMP) priorities for the area around this site. According to the SBD Commercial Developments 2015 guidance, the majority of criminal incidents in commercial developments relate to property crime, so burglary and theft. Other crimes that regularly occur in commercial developments include acts of vandalism, such as graffiti and arson, and occasional assaults on members of staff.
- 3.1.7 In reference to business security, GMP provides the following advice via their website<sup>2</sup>:
1. A well-maintained exterior free of rubbish and graffiti will reduce the likelihood of your business being targeted by criminals. So try to remove any graffiti. If any appears on a nearby wall or structure, call the local council who will send their specialist team.
  2. Identify areas that may be vulnerable to forced entry and have them made more secure.
  3. Make sure any service doors are locked and secure when not in use.
  4. Make sure you have a monitored alarm and that it's fully operational. For advice and approved suppliers of alarms and CCTV, visit the [National Security Inspectorate](#) and the [Security Systems Alarms Inspection Board](#).
  5. Make sure your CCTV is operational, provides facial recognition as well as good quality images and covers any vulnerable areas. 24-hour digital CCTV is also highly recommended. You'll find useful advice on buying surveillance equipment, from the [Surveillance Camera Commissioner](#).
  6. Make sure that wheelie bins are stored away as these can be climbed on to gain access to the building, especially via the first floor.

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<sup>2</sup> Information sourced from <https://www.gmp.police.uk/cp/crime-prevention/business-robbery/protect-your-business/>

7. Make sure there is sufficient lighting around the premises, especially loading areas.
8. Consider moving high-value goods away from display windows overnight.
9. Prune any overgrown bushes or nearby trees, as they can provide cover for anyone trying to hide from view.
10. Doors and windows are particularly vulnerable – use security-rated products to make them more burglar-resistant. For more details visit [Secure by Design](#).
11. External shutters, although effective, may require planning approval. Use attack-resistant laminated glass in sturdy frames where possible. Alternatively, film can be applied to glass to make it more resilient.
12. Anti-ram raider bollards mounted externally can be used to protect frontages but may require planning approval.
13. Try not to keep cash on the premises and always use a bolted-down safe with a time lock and anti-tamper sensors that trigger an alarm.
14. Make sure stockrooms are locked and, where possible, keep stock out of sight.
15. Smoke-generating devices that activate on unauthorised entry create a smokescreen and foil burglary. They're designed not to damage stock.
16. Make sure your keys are not left on the premises and that only designated staff have access. In case of emergency, make sure there's a list of keyholders who can be contacted.

### 3.2 **Modus Operandi (operating method)**

- 3.2.1 In criminology, this is the distinct pattern or manner of working that comes to be associated with a particular criminal. Criminologists have observed that, whatever the speciality - for example, burglary, auto theft and so on - the professional criminal is very likely to adhere to one particular way of operating. If, for example, a burglar begins his career by entering houses from the roof, he will, in all probability, continue this method for as long as he is able to work. Some burglars become so attached to their *modus operandi* that they burgle the same places or people again and again.
- 3.2.2 From analysing the 12 months of crime data above in terms of assessing specific modus operandi, violence and sexual offences and antisocial behaviour are the most prominent, and public order, criminal damage and arson, vehicle crime and other theft are also noteworthy.
- 3.2.3 With reference to the Office for National Statistics (ONS), the following provides details about these types of crime.

### ***Violence and Sexual Offences<sup>3</sup>***

- 3.2.4 Violent crime covers a wide spectrum of offences, from minor assaults such as pushing and shoving that result in no physical harm through to serious incidents of wounding and homicide.
- 3.2.5 Any sexual contact without consent is sexual assault and is a crime. Sexual offences include rape, sexual assault and unlawful sexual activity against adults and children, sexual grooming and indecent exposure.
- 3.2.6 Police recorded crime encompasses a full range of violent crimes and sexual offences, although is restricted to those crimes that have been reported to and recorded by them.

### ***Anti-Social Behaviour***

- 3.2.7 Anti-social behaviour is behaviour that lacks consideration for others and may cause damage to society, whether intentionally or through negligence.
- 3.2.8 Anti-social behaviour is labelled as such when it is deemed contrary to prevailing norms for social conduct. This encompasses a large spectrum of actions and a wide variety of other activities such as those detailed below:

- Abusive, verbal behaviour;
- Arson;
- Assault;
- Begging;
- Behaviour which is abusive to other individuals;
- Cars/vehicles being driven around with noisy car stereos;
- Bullies and Bullying;
- Children and Young People who are bullied in public places;
- Criminal Behaviour;
- Criminal Damage;
- Damage to property;
- Distressing behaviour;
- Domestic violence;

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<sup>3</sup> Information sourced from  
<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/compendium/focusonviolentcrimeandsexualoffences/yearendingmarch2016/overviewofviolentcrimeandsexualoffences>

- Drug and alcohol misuse/abuse;
- Handling stolen property;
- Harassment / Harassing passers-by or local residents;
- Homophobic Behaviour;
- Illegal use of fireworks;
- Intimidating gangs of people (including young people);
- Joy riders;
- Kerb crawling and prostitution;
- Neighbour Intimidation;
- Noise Pollution;
- Nuisance Animals;
- Other Damage;
- Overgrown, unkempt gardens;
- Parking illegally and abandoned vehicles;
- Racist behaviour / Racial harassment;
- Rubbish and dumping of litter;
- Running a business from home;
- Stalking;
- Threatening behaviour;
- Threats made in person or via the telephone;
- Throwing any kind of 'missile';
- Underage or illegal sales;
- Use of inappropriate places for sport/activities;
- Vandalism, graffiti; and
- Youths and young people loitering.

3.2.9 The term Anti-Social Behaviour (ASB) is used to describe a wide range of inconsiderate and nuisance behaviour. While this type of behaviour may not in itself be a criminal offence, it can affect the quality of life of individuals and communities. It is therefore important to address / seek to prevent anti-social behaviour from occurring within development proposals.

*Reducing the Incidences of Anti-Social Behaviour*

3.2.10 It is thought that the creation of a community helps to deal with persistent ASB as residents become proactive in securing the development through informal surveillance. This in turn discourages ASB through the creation of a sense of place, belonging and ownership.

3.2.11 Furthermore, the management and maintenance of the site, along with the provision of appropriate lighting and boundary treatments, will help to discourage ASB from taking place.

***Burglary***

3.2.12 According to the ONS<sup>4</sup>, “Broadly speaking, a person commits a burglary if they enter any building or part of a building as a trespasser and, having done so, steal or attempt to steal anything”.

*Residential*

3.2.13 An in-depth study amongst a group of convicted British burglars, on behalf of Halifax Home Insurance and conducted by leading criminologist Professor Martin Gill, has helped to illustrate why Britain has become Europe's burglary capital.

3.2.14 The report, entitled *The Modus Operandi of a Thief* (conducted amongst 13 convicted British burglars by Professor Martin Gill and his team at University of Leicester spin-out company Perpetuity Research and Consultancy International Ltd, 2006/7, sponsored by Halifax General Insurance) is the culmination of a number of one-to-one interviews with British burglars and a tour of three notorious burglary hotspots in Nottingham, Bedford and the West Midlands.

3.2.15 Burglars point out where and how Britons are leaving their homes wide open to burglars:

- Burglar alarms are often left inactivated or ignored. This information was confirmed in a separate poll by Halifax (Omnibus research amongst 1668 British adults sponsored by Halifax General Insurance, 2007) where 34% of householders with an alarm fitted to their home said they rarely activated it.

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<sup>4</sup> Information sourced from  
<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/articles/overviewofburglaryandotherhouseholdtheft/englandandwales>

A further 33% also said that they assume sounding burglar alarms in their neighbourhood to be false.

- Doors and windows are often left unsecured or even wide open, allowing potential burglars to let themselves in. This was backed up by 64% of householders who confessed to occasionally leaving doors unlocked whilst away from the home, and a further 37% whilst inside the home - even though statistics show that 22% of burglaries are carried out with the thief aware that the home was occupied. One offender stated that they often gained entry to homes by putting their hands in a letterbox and pulling the keys out.
- Some thieves have learnt how to dismantle alarms, remove patio doors and force open sash windows.
- Even the security lighting can be used to help thieves see inside an unlit home. Others will pose as a bogus caller to gain entry, wear disguises to avoid CCTV camera detection and even poison meat to silence noisy animals.

3.2.16 In general, burglars prefer empty properties, often looking for visual clues such as an empty drive.

3.2.17 Evidence of occupancy is generally a bad sign, so any lights, televisions and radios left on are usually off-putting for burglars.

3.2.18 Burglars are often attracted by the sight of valuables, including car keys. They spot these by simply looking through windows and doors. Householders need to be careful about the type of goods that are on display. Blinds can help to obscure vision.

3.2.19 Empty packaging left outside in view of passers-by (e.g. plasma TV boxes) suggests that there is something expensive in the property worth stealing.

#### *Assessing the Risk*

3.2.20 An activated alarm linked to a formal response will deter some thieves.

3.2.21 Window and door locks make access more difficult, especially for the opportunist.

3.2.22 In high crime areas, some burglars advised fitting bars and grilles to vulnerable windows to stop anyone climbing through.

3.2.23 Security lights that are positioned high out of reach where they cannot be easily repositioned are seen as a nuisance by some burglars.

3.2.24 Trees and hedges are used as cover for burglars since it decreases the chances they could be seen by a passer-by. Fences, high walls and gates surrounding the property make escape more difficult.

3.2.25 Many burglars said that they don't like dogs because they bark and draw attention and can also bite. A simple sign warning of dogs was enough to deter some.

#### *Getting In*

3.2.26 The majority of offenders preferred opportunist burglaries, because it “made their lives easier”. In the majority of cases, these opportunities were said to present themselves in the form of an open window or an unlocked door - most burglars opting for the back door first.

3.2.27 For an opportunist burglary, some criminals will burgle garages and sheds first in order to access tools to help them gain entry to the house.

3.2.28 If an opportunity did not present itself, then the second most common type of burglary in the study was breaking and entering or forced entry. A variety of techniques were used for this such as using a crowbar, spade or shovel, wrapping a brick in a jumper and smashing a window or simply kicking a door down.

3.2.29 The most common tool used to aid entry was a screwdriver, often used as a lever to remove windows, doors and hinges. Other tools included crowbars and bolt cutters.

3.2.30 Some offenders even dismantle alarms and patio doors, which clearly involves a high level of skill and dexterity.

3.2.31 Burglars are not above impersonating someone else to access a property. One burglar would gain the confidence of the owner by posing as a car washer to gain entrance to a home. Once inside, they would distract the homeowner to enable them to steal items of value.

#### *Avoiding Security*

3.2.32 Burglar alarms are often not set at night, and often even during the day when the house was left unoccupied. Even when an alarm is set burglars feel they have some time before the police will arrive - noting that the public were often accustomed to alarms going off and so don't take a lot of notice.

3.2.33 Even when security products and initiatives are more sophisticated, so too are the methods and techniques employed by offenders. In some cases, security measures work to a burglar's advantage, a case in point is security lights. In the opinion of

burglars these can significantly improve their vision when accessing a property, providing a handy light to work by. Others reposition motion sensors to prevent them from illuminating when they pass.

3.2.34 The effectiveness of CCTV is often mitigated by wearing disguises - typically hats, largely baseball caps.

3.2.35 In addition to wearing protective gloves to ensure no DNA/prints were left at the scene, carrier bags are sometimes worn over shoes to ensure no footprints are left behind.

#### *Accessing and Escaping from a Property*

3.2.36 Generally, burglars like to access property from the rear as it offers a safe environment. Having adequate fences and locked gates can make this a less inviting opportunity.

3.2.37 Alleyways are seen as a useful resource in both accessing properties from the back and providing a quick escape. Increasingly, these alleyways are fitted with wrought iron gates.

3.2.38 Those that were closed and locked did serve as a deterrent to some burglars.

#### *Commercial*

3.2.39 The West Yorkshire Police (WYP) website description of Commercial Burglary<sup>5</sup> adds that, "A person is guilty of burglary if he or she enters any building as a trespasser intending to do any one of three things: steal, cause damage or inflict grievous bodily harm."

3.2.40 The different types of burglary may be categorised as:

- Smash and Grab;
- Opportunistic; and
- Sophisticated.

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<sup>5</sup> Information sourced from <https://www.westyorkshire.police.uk/advice/business-security/business-security/commercial-burglary>



### ***Smash and Grab***

3.2.41 These burglaries, characterised by the violence of the burglars' entry, are the most common. Burglars may use paving stones to smash windows, scaffolding poles to lever up protective grilles, or power tools to cut padlocks or grilles off.

3.2.42 Smash and grab attacks are usually to the front of the building, although rear shutters on out-of-town sites are a common target. They are carried out at great speed to avoid the effects of the alarm. Most are over within a minute.

### ***Opportunistic***

3.2.43 These burglaries lack obvious planning. Burglars usually enter through the most vulnerable points: through a roof-light, forcing a window, perhaps finding an insecure door. Sometimes they smash a window and steal from the window display. They seldom try to overcome the alarm system, although they may take pains to avoid setting it off. Usually they take very little – typically only what can easily be carried off.

### ***Sophisticated***

3.2.44 In these incidents, burglars overcome alarm systems in various ways. They may cut the signalling of the alarm system, fill exterior alarm bells with foam to stop them sounding, and smash strobe lights. In some cases, the burglars avoid the alarm system either as a result of careful observation or through inside information. In others a common ploy is to set the alarm off repeatedly and wait until the police and key holders stop responding to it. With the alarm disabled the burglars have more time to act and will usually enter unobtrusively, forcing side or back doors or windows. Their usual target is high value stock and sometimes the safe (which is often removed entirely). Often their exit route is different from that used for entry. Once they have the run of the building, burglars have been known to open loading bays and bring in vehicles.

### ***What Can You Do About It?***

#### ***Slow Them Down***

3.2.45 Time is a key factor in most burglaries. Burglars will put themselves at risk of being caught for as little time as possible. For them, the risks are highest when they are conspicuous to passers-by or in the short time they have to complete their burglary after a burglar alarm has gone off. To prevent burglaries effectively, you should delay burglars at these times for as long as possible in order to make the risk seem

unacceptable. The best way to do this is to put your resources into more than one of the types or levels of physical protection advised in the SBD Commercial Developments guidance - the more barriers you create, the more you will slow them down.

#### *Train Your Staff*

- 3.2.46 You need the full support of your staff. Teach them about the burglary prevention measures you have taken, and the correct use of any equipment you have installed.
- 3.2.47 Reporting suspicious circumstances: Explain to staff the importance, for example, of keeping a watchful eye for suspicious people or vehicles to prevent people 'casing' your premises.
- 3.2.48 Get them involved: You can develop their commitment to crime prevention by asking their opinions and ideas about the measures you are taking or propose to take.
- 3.2.49 Key security: Above all, you should build key security into your training programme. Ensure that only selected staff have access to certain keys or combination locks, and that keys to secure areas are not left within reach. Selected staff and managers must thoroughly understand their responsibilities for locking and securing fastenings on the windows and doors, cabinets, internal offices where cash may be held, safes, rooflights and any other exits.

#### *Physically Protect the Target*

- 3.2.50 Physical protection of the target is discussed further in Chapter 4. Protection methods may include the following:
- Strengthening potential entrances;
  - Grilles and shutters;
  - Fit grilles inside;
  - Glass 'film' on windows;
  - Laminated glass;
  - Safes;
  - Secure cages;
  - Vehicles traps; and
  - The overall design.

### *Watching and Deterring Intruders*

3.2.51 Intruder surveillance and deterrents are discussed further in Chapter 4. Examples may include the following:

- Intruder alarms;
- Video surveillance;
- Controlling vehicle access;
- Locking escape routes; and
- Lighting.

### *Assessing the Risk*

3.2.52 An activated alarm linked to a formal response will deter some thieves.

3.2.53 Window and door locks make access more difficult, especially for the opportunist.

3.2.54 In high crime areas, some burglars advised fitting bars and grilles to vulnerable windows to stop anyone climbing through.

3.2.55 Security lights that are positioned high out of reach where they cannot be easily repositioned are seen as a nuisance by some burglars.

3.2.56 Trees and hedges are used as cover for burglars since it decreases the chances they could be seen by a passer-by. Fences, high walls and gates surrounding the property make escape more difficult.

### *Vehicle Crime*

3.2.57 Most vehicle crimes are associated with the theft of property from inside the vehicle. In this respect, in order to reduce the chances of becoming a victim, it is possible to minimise the availability of property worth stealing, i.e. by doing something to make it less attractive to the thief, more difficult to take or by reducing the opportunity to commit the theft.

### *Reducing the theft of property from vehicles*

- Remove personal items such as handbags, leather jackets, wallets, laptops and shopping from the vehicle. These should never be left on view. If necessary, some of this can be locked in the boot;
- A portable Satellite Navigation system (Sat-Nav) should be carried on the person or left in a locked boot, together with its cradle or mat when leaving the car. Any suction cup marks on the windscreen should be wiped away as

their presence will indicate to the thief that you may have a device, such as a Sat-Nav, hidden in the glove compartment. This may not be the case, but this won't stop the thief from smashing a side window to take a look;

- Always close the windows and sunroof, lock the doors and set the immobiliser and alarm before leaving the vehicle, even for a minute, such as de-icing the vehicle outside the property;
- If the vehicle does not have an alarm, then have one fitted;
- Lock the doors and boot before driving away to reduce the chances of snatch theft and robbery when stopped, even within a residential area;
- Take extra care if you are driving a convertible vehicle with the roof down. Consider raising the windows when stationary or in slow traffic and keep the doors and boot locked; and
- When parking at home, use garages if you have one, or park on a well-lit driveway or hardstanding, rather than in the street. If street parking is the only option, park in a place that is well lit and overlooked.

#### *Reducing the incidence of vehicle theft*

When leaving the vehicle;

- Always remove the ignition keys, close the windows and lock the doors, even for a short time, such as when you are paying for the petrol at the filling station;
- Always engage the steering lock;
- When using a remote operating key always double check that you have indeed locked the car. People often accidentally press the button as they make their way in through the front door and don't realise that they've just unlocked the car again;
- Don't leave the vehicle unattended with the engine running to warm it up or defrost the windows;
- When at home put the keys in a drawer or cupboard and never leave them on view through a window or door or close to the door's letter plate;
- When going out, with or without the car, always take the car keys with you and ensure that the home is properly secured; and
- When parking at home use the garage if you have one or park on a well-lit driveway or hard standing, rather than in the street. If street parking is the only option, park in a place that is well lit and overlooked.

## **4 DESIGNING OUT CRIME**

### **4.1 An Overview for Consideration**

4.1.1 Considering the typical modus operandi detailed in section 3.2, the main principles of designing out crime are based on the notion that most crime is opportunistic. By using design measures to increase natural surveillance and define ownership of public and private space, a sense of community can be fostered where potential criminals are made to feel unwelcome.

#### ***Natural Surveillance***

4.1.2 Natural surveillance relies on observation - people and property visible from occupied buildings are less vulnerable than those out of sight. The fear of crime can also be reduced in places which are in continuous occupation and where people are passing or looking on. The orientation of entrances and windows to buildings can encourage surveillance and 'self-policing'. Good lighting is also an important tool in achieving this.

#### ***Public and Private***

4.1.3 Public and private spaces should be clearly defined to deter unauthorised access into clearly 'private' areas. Public and private spaces can be separated by low walls, changes in surfacing materials or other symbolic entrance features. Door entry systems also 'create' areas of defensible space in multi-occupied buildings, as well as helping to restrict unauthorised entry.

4.1.4 It is also important to consider the effect of crime prevention measures on properties adjacent to a development, and the personal safety of people. A 'Fortress Approach' for new developments is discouraged as it tends to be unattractive and can result in an oppressive environment for both residents and passing pedestrians. It is important to have linkages through to other residential areas. A balance has to be struck between maintaining an attractive environment whilst achieving effective prevention of crime.

### **4.2 Secured by Design**

4.2.1 Secured by Design is a police initiative to guide and encourage those engaged within the specification, design and build of new homes to adopt crime prevention measures.

4.2.2 For residential dwellings, the most recent guidance is Homes 2019, and for commercial properties the most recent guidance is Commercial 2015. Both guidance documents provide advice that has been proven to reduce the opportunity for crime

and the fear of crime, creating safer, more secure and sustainable environments.

4.2.3 The Homes 2019 guidance document is presented in three sections, as follows:

- Section 1: Development layout and design.
  - This section provides guidance on all aspects of design and layout that impact on the creation of a safe and secure environments, including road layout, footpath design, communal areas, dwelling boundaries, car parking and lighting.
- Section 2: Physical security of the home.
  - Section 2 provides the 'Police Preferred Specification' for all physical security requirements for new or refurbished homes. Section 2a reflects the requirements of the UK Buildings Regulations. Section 2b addresses bespoke new homes and existing homes, so is applicable for the proposed apartment buildings.
- Section 3: Additional features.
  - The essential security dwelling detail requirements in Section 2 are further enhanced by the requirements set out in this section. Section 3 addresses the requirements for a range of additional or optional residential features, such as enhanced glazing, bicycle storage, drying rooms, external bin stores, etc.

4.2.4 The Commercial 2015 guidance document is presented in two sections, as follows:

- Section 1: Development layout and design.
  - This section provides guidance on all aspects of design and layout that impact on the creation of a safe and secure environments, including road layout and footpath design, perimeter security, site access, storage facilities, signage and lighting.
- Section 2: Physical security specifications
  - Section 2 outlines the specifications for physical security requirements for new or refurbished commercial developments.

4.2.5 This chapter will assess the proposed development at Brunswick Mill, Manchester in the context of the above sections within the guidance documents. Guidance given within the Homes 2019 and Commercial 2015 guidance documents will be combined where applicable.

4.2.6 Following the assessment of the proposed development, recommendations will be provided to incorporate into the design.

### 4.3 **Section 1: Development Layout and Design**

4.3.1 In every development, there are a number of aspects of design that should be considered to reduce opportunities for crime. The following section assesses the design considerations as highlighted in the Homes 2019 guidance and Commercial 2015 guidance and makes recommendations as appropriate.

#### ***Layout of roads and footpaths***

4.3.2 There are no through roads within the proposed development, all vehicular entrance points to the development will allow for two-way traffic and are solely to access parking or servicing/drop-off areas.

4.3.3 Vehicular access to the site is proposed from three access points off Bradford Road. The first is proposed to be to the northeast area of the site to allow access to a car parking area for the commercial units proposed to be within the redeveloped Brunswick Mill buildings. The second is located at a current access point adjacent to the southwest elevation of Brunswick Mill and is proposed to be retained to provide access to further car parking. The final access point will also be located at an existing access point towards the southwest of Bradford Road, and will provide access to a small number of parking spaces for the adjacent retail unit.

4.3.4 Footpaths throughout the site largely follow the vehicular access routes off Bradford Road. Additional pedestrian access points to the site are located off Bradford Road through the main arched entrance to the Brunswick Mill courtyard, and to the south of the proposed development off Beswick Street (to the east of the proposed retail unit). Access to the residents' parking area in the southwest of the site can be gained from the Ashton Canal towpath from an access point and footpath adjacent to the bin stores to the east of the site. This access point is proposed to be well-lit and welcoming.

4.3.5 The proposed site layout aims to create a permeable hierarchy of routes through the site. This promotes intuitive wayfinding with options along the main routes for non-

residents, in addition to a hierarchy of routes that creates defensible space by psychologically giving the impression that the area beyond is private.

- 4.3.6 The position of such routes and open spaces are located such that passive surveillance is enabled by residents, office and commercial space users. However, while passive surveillance and high levels of street activity are desirable and have been proven to deter criminal behaviour, they are no guarantee of lower crime, which evidence proves is achieved primarily through the control and limitation of permeability.
- 4.3.7 Any furniture, walls and planting beds will all be low in height, so providing users with good visibility. Access to the two proposed rooftop garden spaces on Level 06 of the proposed new residential building (shown within Drawing L(--)-106) will be limited to two points for the southernmost garden, and one point for the northernmost garden. The security measures for these gates will be confirmed by the management strategy. It is recommended that this complies with the Homes 2019 guidance, which states that the security of the development should not be compromised by excessive permeability.
- 4.3.8 The proposal is to minimise any street clutter along the pavements and footpaths. This will enable visual openness and help to remove the possibility of pinch points, places of concealment and unnecessary maintenance, while reducing any searching behaviour from criminals looking to engage in opportunistic crime. These spaces follow the principles of good footpath design by ensuring that the spaces are wide, open and overlooked by surrounding commercial and residential units. The proposed Ashton Canal frontage and access aims to promote movement by walking and cycling.
- 4.3.9 The lighting strategy for the proposed development will comply with BS 5489:2013 and will ensure the streetscape is kept free from clutter, while helping to illuminate facial features and reduce fear of crime.
- 4.3.10 This will respond positively to the Secured by Design requirement that lighting illuminates all elevations containing a doorset, car parking and footpaths leading to dwellings.
- 4.3.11 The strategy will also consider that light pollution on the canal needs to be limited in line with advice from other environmental assessments submitted with this application. This is in line with the Secured by Design guidance to use the most environmentally friendly light sources wherever possible.



4.3.12 The detailed lighting design will be confirmed at the detailed design stage and will follow the appropriate guidance.

4.3.13 The landscape planting design within the site will be arranged to avoid creating pinch points, places of concealment and unnecessary maintenance.

***Communal areas and play space***

4.3.14 Communal open spaces are proposed in a number of discrete locations throughout the development. Two rooftop garden spaces are proposed on Level 06 of the proposed new residential building (shown within Drawing L(--)-106) for use by residents only.

4.3.15 Access to these rooftop spaces will be limited to two points for the southernmost garden, and one point for the northernmost garden. The security measures for these gates will be confirmed by the management strategy. It is recommended that this complies with the Homes 2019 guidance, which states that the security of the development should not be compromised by excessive permeability.

4.3.16 The courtyard space within the original Brunswick Mill buildings is proposed to be retained as a communal amenity space. Access can be gained from the main arched entrance off Bradford Road, and in addition to amenity space will provide access to the ground floor commercial units and residential communal hallways and stairwells.

4.3.17 The proposed site layout defines these spaces by use of planting schemes, which are congruous with the overall development and are located to be inclusively designed and integral to the neighbourhood.

***Dwelling boundaries and commercial perimeter security***

4.3.18 As residential and commercial spaces are mixed throughout the development, the below described boundary scheme acknowledges guidance for both residential and commercial developments.

4.3.19 It is recommended that the boundary between public and private areas is clearly indicated. This can be achieved using landscaping and planting schemes, or fencing and walls to signify private space.

4.3.20 The existing boundaries of the site are well-defined by the surrounding road infrastructure, and the boundary with Ashton Canal to the southeast. Private space surrounding the car park and buildings within the southwest of the site will be well-defined with planting and landscaped features in addition to fencing/hedgerows to

limit pedestrian routes through the site. Private access points into buildings will be limited and clearly marked throughout the development.

4.3.21 When creating the detailed landscape design, planting will generally be kept low or otherwise designed in order to ensure building frontages are open to view to aid natural surveillance of footpaths and car parking areas. Trees will be suitable (e.g. open branched or light foliage or columnar fastigiate habit etc).

4.3.22 Clear signage will direct residents and site users to residential and commercial units from site entrances and parking areas. All units will be clearly numbered to assist residents, site users, postal workers, and emergency services to navigate the site.

#### ***Layout and orientation of dwellings***

4.3.23 Buildings within the site are proposed to be up to seven storeys in height – the existing Mill building will remain a six-storey building. New proposed development to the south east of the Mill will be four to seven storeys in height.

4.3.24 The redeveloped Mill building encloses a central courtyard, allowing natural surveillance of this space and its entrance off Bradford Road. The buildings within the remainder of the site are proposed to overlook a central parking space, thus providing natural surveillance of building entrance points and parking areas.

4.3.25 As the proposed development is for mixed use – both commercial and residential – there will likely be occupation of the development throughout the day, thus increasing the opportunity for natural surveillance, community interaction, engagement, and participation.

#### ***Gable end walls***

4.3.26 Gable end walls will not be incorporated within the proposed development. All elevations will have windows to ensure increased surveillance over all areas of the site.

#### ***Dwelling identification***

4.3.27 Dwelling numbers are not indicated at this stage of the development and will be confirmed at the detailed design stage.

4.3.28 Clear signage (naming and/or numbering) of properties will be implemented to assist residents, postal workers, and the attendance of emergency services.

### ***Climbing aids***

- 4.3.29 The proposed site layout and proposed dwelling designs show that potential climbing aids have been minimised. For example, the allocated bin store for each building is not located directly adjacent to the building elevation and is instead located internally.
- 4.3.30 Boundary walls, bins and fuel stores, street furniture, trees, low flat roofs, and rooftop green spaces will be designed to remove climbing aids to gain access into the properties. The refuse store proposed to be positioned due south of the Mill building adjacent to the eastern boundary may be susceptible to climbing to access the Mill building, so requires further attention in the detailed design to ensure suitable deterrents are in place.

### ***Vehicle parking***

- 4.3.31 Vehicle parking is proposed to be provided within a number of areas throughout the development.
- 4.3.32 Residential parking located within the southwest of the site will be bounded by hedgerow and will benefit from surrounding natural surveillance from residential and commercial spaces.
- 4.3.33 Parking areas for commercial site users will be clearly identified using signage throughout the site. Car parking located to the northeast of the site is recommended to be secured with appropriate high security fencing or high walls, with a gated entrance, adhering to guidelines. Delivery/drop off areas and staff parking for the commercial units will be clearly defined and benefit from surrounding natural surveillance from residential and commercial spaces.
- 4.3.34 Secure bicycle storage both for residents and users of the commercial units will be provided throughout the site. All of these storage areas will be located within buildings.
- 4.3.35 Parking areas will be lit to the relevant levels as described in paragraph 16.7 of the Homes 2019 guidance.

### ***Planting in new developments***

- 4.3.36 The proposed development will benefit from a planting scheme including new trees, shrubs and grassed areas that aim to provide a network of green links and communal areas. Carefully selected trees and shrubs can be used to 'green up' the most hostile

of environments providing both horizontal and vertical interest without adding to crime risks.

- 4.3.37 The detailed planting scheme will ensure the layout provides sufficient space to accommodate specimens once they have reached maturity, clear of access routes and required circulation areas.
- 4.3.38 The detailed scheme will take full account of all other opportunities for crime, so avoiding introducing climbing aids and designing in defensive planting in places such as windowless walls with certain species of plant such as spiny or thorny shrubs to help prevent graffiti and loitering and create perimeter security.
- 4.3.39 Planting will not impede the opportunity for natural surveillance or any specified CCTV system and must avoid the creation of potential hiding places.
- 4.3.40 A maintenance and management programme will be put in place to ensure the landscape fulfils the aims of the original design.

***External security issues***

- 4.3.41 External security of the proposed development is recommended to be reinforced through the design of landscaping, external furniture and litter bins, natural surveillance and recessed doorways.
- 4.3.42 The above section outlines the recommended landscape strategy to be implemented in order to promote security within the development.
- 4.3.43 External furniture, such as benches, planters and litterbins, will be of robust vandal and graffiti resistant design. Furniture should be fixed into the ground in order to prevent its theft or use as a climbing tool. Items will not be placed close to a building line or boundary where it can be used as a climbing tool.
- 4.3.44 A number of entrance doorways within the proposed new residential building are recessed, which opposes the guidance given within the Homes 2019 guidance. However, these recessed doorsets are shallow and not covered immediately above due to the surrounding pillar design. This allows an unobstructed view of these entrances from windows above, and subsequently heightened natural surveillance.
- 4.3.45 It is recommended that recessed doorways are not too deep, as this creates areas that cannot be overlooked and obstruct natural surveillance. Additionally, they may act as a feature that collects windblown litter that could be used to start fires. Where

recessed doorways are unavoidable, it is recommended that a secure doorset with a vision panel is used.

### ***Street lighting***

- 4.3.46 The lighting strategy for the proposed development will ensure the streetscape is kept free from clutter, while helping to illuminate facial features and reduce fear of crime.
- 4.3.47 This will respond positively to the Secured by Design requirement that lighting illuminates all elevations containing a doorset, car parking and footpaths leading to buildings. It is also recommended that the lighting scheme illuminates entrances and gateways into the development. Lighting will be adequate for public streets, and will be well-integrated and in keeping with the overall scheme.
- 4.3.48 Given the proposed development is predominantly for residential use, it is the residential guidelines within Homes 2019 that will be prioritised. However, the lighting strategy will be co-ordinated with any CCTV installation required for the commercial elements of the proposed development. This will ensure lighting is sufficient to support a CCTV system.
- 4.3.49 The strategy will also consider that light pollution on the canal needs to be limited in line with advice from other environmental assessments submitted with this application. This is in line with the Secured by Design guidance to use the most environmentally friendly light sources wherever possible.
- 4.3.50 The detailed lighting design will be confirmed at the detailed design stage and will follow the appropriate guidance.

### ***Storage facilities***

- 4.3.51 Plant will be protected within secure internal storage rooms. It is recommended that if the value/nature of the stored items is predicted to heighten crime risk, then CCTV coverage may be required.
- 4.3.52 Waste stores are proposed to be secured internally and within secure external stores, with separate areas for the storage of commercial and residential waste.
- 4.3.53 It is recommended that secure stores are located in each of the proposed buildings for the safe storage of cleaning equipment and cleaning fluids.

### ***Utility services***

4.3.54 Utility access covers are recommended to be secured to prevent access and damage by unauthorised persons. This will help to protect the security of the development from any unauthorised disconnection from services. Arrangements for utility meters will be confirmed by the management strategy, including access arrangements for meter readings.

### ***Building shell***

4.3.55 Given the development will contain a mix of commercial and residential properties, none of the elevations will be windowless, enabling wide natural surveillance across the site. It is recommended that the proposed retail unit at the west of the site does not cover windows with branded stickers or images that may limit the natural surveillance of the street and pavement beyond.

4.3.56 It is recommended that unauthorised entry will be prevented through the implementation of grilles, air ventilation apertures and shutters to be fitted to any external points that could be misused for unauthorised entry i.e. ventilation ducts. In addition, external rainwater pipes are recommended to be either square or rectangular in section and fitted flush against the wall or contained within a wall cavity or covered recess to prevent climbing and unauthorised access.

4.3.57 As graffiti tends to attract further graffiti, the management of the site throughout its lifetime will involve the removal of graffiti as soon as possible. In order to ease this management task, surfaces will be coated with an anti-graffiti glaze.

### ***Internal layout issues***

4.3.58 It is important to consider the internal layout when examining the security of the site. It is recommended that the space outside and inside of entrance doors are well illuminated during dark hours, which will allow site users and residents to have a clear view of approaches to an entrance.

4.3.59 Internal doorsets for the commercial units are recommended to be fitted with locking furniture so that rooms can be locked when left unoccupied. Rooms storing higher risk/value equipment, such as IT servers, security systems and utilities services are recommended to include more robust doorsets and locking systems. This locking furniture may include the incorporation of electronic access control systems.

#### 4.4 **Section 2: Physical Security**

4.4.1 The recent recognition that security forms part of a sustainable and vibrant development has been demonstrated by the inclusion of a Building Regulation in England and Wales. Part Q of Schedule 1 to the Building Regulations in both countries specifically states that “Reasonable provision must be made to resist unauthorised access...” There are a number of security categories that are listed within the Homes 2019 and Commercial 2015 guidance and the following section assesses the proposed development against these categories. Recommendations are then made as appropriate.

##### ***Dwelling and apartment entrance doorsets***

4.4.2 Doorset types for the proposed dwelling and commercial premises are not yet specified.

4.4.3 The applicant will adhere to the required standards as stated in section 21 of the Homes 2019 guidance and section 57 of the Commercial 2015 guidance.

##### ***Windows, roof windows and roof lights***

4.4.4 The proposed windows, roof windows and roof lights are not yet specified.

4.4.5 The applicant will adhere to the required standards as stated in section 22 and section 47 of the Homes 2019 guidance, and section 51 and 55 of the Commercial 2015 guidance.

##### ***Conservatories and sun rooms***

4.4.6 The proposed development does not include conservatories or sun rooms.

##### ***Lightweight framed walls in houses and buildings containing multiple dwellings or bedrooms***

4.4.7 Specifications regarding the lightweight framed walls in the buildings containing multiple dwellings have not yet been described.

4.4.8 The applicant will adhere to the required standards as stated in section 24 of the Homes 2019 guidance.

##### ***External lighting***

4.4.9 The lighting strategy for the proposed development will aim to provide building-mounted public lighting along footpaths, including the enhancement of links with the

canal towpath, which will ensure the streetscape is kept free from clutter, while helping to illuminate facial features and reduce fear of crime.

4.4.10 This will respond positively to the Secured by Design requirement that lighting illuminates all elevations containing a doorset, car parking and footpaths leading to dwellings.

4.4.11 The strategy will also consider that light pollution on the canal needs to be limited in line with advice from other environmental assessments submitted with this application. This is in line with the Secured by Design guidance to use the most environmentally friendly light sources wherever possible.

4.4.12 The detailed lighting design will be confirmed at the detailed design stage and will follow the appropriate guidance.

#### ***Utility meters***

4.4.13 Arrangement for electricity and water meters for the residential and commercial units will be confirmed by the management strategy.

#### ***Access control and additional security requirements for buildings containing multiple dwellings or bedrooms***

4.4.14 A visitor door entry system will be implemented to allow a visitor to ring any selected dwelling within the building and hold a two-way simultaneous conversation between the visitor and occupant of the dwelling. It will enable the occupant of the dwelling to remotely operate the electric locking device from their individual terminal, allowing the visitor access.

4.4.15 Communal entrance doorsets are not yet specified, but will adhere to the required standards as stated in section 27 of the Homes 2019 guidance.

4.4.16 Movement through the buildings will be managed by the management strategy.

4.4.17 It is recommended that these meet the requirements and standards outlined within section 27 of the Homes 2019 guidance.

#### ***Telephone and Internet Protocol (IP) based visitor door entry systems with or without remote unlocking***

4.4.18 Core entrances to apartments will make use of an appropriate intercom system.



### ***CCTV and Recording***

4.4.19 The scheme is designed to include infrastructure for CCTV coverage, the extent of which will be confirmed at the detailed design stage and will respond to the appropriate guidance from Secured by Design. It is recommended that all apartment and commercial block entrances, all lifts and rooftop green spaces are included within the CCTV coverage.

### ***CCTV management and maintenance protocols***

4.4.20 The CCTV system is not yet confirmed and will be confirmed at the detailed design stage.

### ***Doorsets providing alternative access to communal areas (other than the primary shared or communal access doorset) including emergency egress doorsets***

4.4.21 The applicant will adhere to the required standards as stated in section 31 of the Homes 2019 guidance.

### ***Mail delivery in buildings containing multiple dwellings or bedrooms***

4.4.22 Arrangements for mail delivery in buildings containing multiple dwellings or bedrooms have not yet been specified across the proposed development.

4.4.23 For the proposed apartments and any other communal mail delivery, the applicant will adhere to the required standards as stated in section 32 and section 38 of the Homes 2019 guidance.

### ***Mail delivery in buildings containing commercial units***

4.4.24 Arrangements for mail delivery for the commercial units has not yet been specified. The applicant will adhere to the required standards stated in section 63 of the Commercial 2015 guidance.

### ***Lighting for buildings containing multiple dwellings***

4.4.25 The lighting strategy for the proposed development will ensure the space within and surrounding residential buildings is kept free from clutter, while helping to illuminate facial features and reduce fear of crime. Communal spaces within buildings, such as common entrance points, lobbies, landings, corridors and stairwells will be provided with 24-hour lighting.

4.4.26 This will respond positively to the Secured by Design requirement that lighting illuminates all elevations containing a doorset, car parking and footpaths leading to dwellings.

4.4.27 The applicant will adhere to the required standards as stated in section 33 of the Homes 2019 guidance.

***Loft hatches in communal areas***

4.4.28 Loft hatches will not be included within communal areas.

***Additional or alternative requirements for new apartment buildings containing multiple dwellings or bedrooms***

4.4.29 Details for the communal and shared doorsets for proposed apartment buildings have not yet been specified.

4.4.30 The applicant will adhere to the required standards as stated in section 44 of the Homes 2019 guidance.

***Commercial perimeter and external areas***

4.4.31 Details for the perimeter to the parking provided for the commercial units to the northeast of the development have not yet been confirmed, but it is likely this area will be walled or fenced and will follow guidance given within sections 43, 44 and 46 of the Commercial 2015 guidance.

4.4.32 It has not yet been confirmed whether security bollards will be installed at the proposed development. However, it is acknowledged that they may be suitable to implement on the wide pedestrian areas to the south of the site. If implemented, these will follow guidance provided within section 45 of the Commercial 2015 guidance.

***Building shell security***

4.4.33 The proposed windows for the commercial and retail elements have not yet been specified. The applicant will adhere to the required standards as stated in section 51 and 55 of the Commercial 2015 guidance.

4.4.34 The use of roller shutters and grilles has not yet been specified. If utilised, the applicant will adhere to the required standards as stated within section 52 of the Commercial 2015 guidance.

4.4.35 External doorsets, their locking systems and glazing for the commercial elements of the proposed development have not yet been specified. The applicant will adhere to specifications with section 56, 57 and 58 of the Commercial 2015 guidance respectively.

4.4.36 All ground floor and easily accessible glazing throughout the development are recommended to adhere to the security glazing specifications listed within section 60 of the Commercial 2015 guidance.

***Electronic access control***

4.4.37 Electronic access control has not yet been specified for the commercial units within the proposed development. However, it is anticipated that it will be incorporated within appropriate external and internal doorsets and will adhere to the guidance given within section 61 of the Commercial 2015 guidance.

***Protection of window apertures***

4.4.38 The security of window apertures has not yet been specified within the proposed design. The applicant will consider the specifications and guidance given within section 62 of the Commercial 2015 guidance during window design for the commercial elements of the development.

***Internal security considerations***

4.4.39 Intruder alarms within the commercial units will be provided at the discretion of the occupier. Alarms within communal spaces will be installed by the management group employed at the site, and are not yet specified

4.4.40 It is recommended intruder alarms meet the requirements of BS EN 50131 (wired and wire free systems). All installations shall be in accordance with the current electrical regulations.

4.4.41 Where internal computer server rooms are planned, it is recommended that consideration will be given to the structure of the internal walls, floors and ceilings to provide appropriate security and to prevent damage by fire, smoke or fire extinguishment from other parts of the building.

4.4.42 It is recommended that any commercial safes and strongrooms to be planned within the proposed development will adhere to the standards given within section 68 of the Commercial 2015 guidelines.

### ***Other design security considerations***

4.4.43 Whilst not considered to be a significant risk, the levels of crime indicated within the area suggest that measures to minimise the possibility of arson may be appropriate, particularly with regards to the commercial units. Measures could include additional deterrents to unauthorised entry to the site and additional prevention of unauthorised entry to the buildings.

### ***Undercrofts***

4.4.44 Undercroft car parking is not being considered within this proposal.

## **4.5 Section 3: Additional Features**

4.5.1 This Section of the Homes 2019 guidance requires consideration of the security requirements for a range of additional or optional residential features that may be included as part of a proposed development. The below points consider the proposed development in relation to each of the features outlined in the Homes 2019 guidance.

### ***Doorsets providing access/egress from communal areas, houses and buildings containing multiple dwellings or bedrooms***

4.5.2 Details of the doorsets providing access/egress from communal areas, apartment buildings containing multiple dwellings or bedrooms has not yet been specified.

4.5.3 The applicant will adhere to the required standards as stated in section 52 of the Homes 2019 guidance

### ***Additional window requirements for the SBD Gold Award***

4.5.4 This aspect of the Homes 2019 guidance is required for development proposals “in certain high crime locations only”. Based on the crime data highlighted in Chapter 3, it is recommended that laminated glass meeting the requirements of BS EN 356:2000 class 1A are considered for installation on ground floor and first floor units of the proposed development.

### ***External garage doorsets***

4.5.5 The proposed development does not include any external garage doorsets.

### ***Car parking***

4.5.6 This point relates to any residential communal parking at the proposed development.

- 4.5.7 Communal parking is proposed within the southwest of the site. The open communal parking within the southwest of the site will be overlooked by buildings on all sides, so will benefit from natural surveillance.
- 4.5.8 The proposed lighting strategy will ensure the parking areas are kept free from clutter, while helping to illuminate facial features and reduce fear of crime.
- 4.5.9 The detailed lighting design will be confirmed at the detailed design stage and will be at levels recommended in section 55 of the Homes 2019 guidance.

***Secure external storage facilities and bicycle security***

- 4.5.10 There will be one external storage facility for refuse storage adjoining the southwest elevation of Brunswick Mill and bordering the Ashton Canal towpath to the southeast. This storage facility will adhere to the security standards listed within section 56 of the Homes 2019 guidance and section 46 of the Commercial 2015 guidance.
- 4.5.11 All other storage facilities will be integral to buildings.

***Integral communal bin, mobility vehicles and bicycle stores***

- 4.5.12 The proposed mixed use residential and commercial buildings include communal facilities for refuse storage and cycle parking, although these will be kept separate for commercial and residential users. Access to these storage areas will be secured by fob operated doors or gates.

***Internal communal drying rooms***

- 4.5.13 The proposed development does not include communal drying rooms, so this point is not applicable.

***Private external lighting and dwelling lighting***

- 4.5.14 The lighting strategy for the proposed development will aim to provide building-mounted public lighting along footpaths, which will ensure the streetscape is kept free from clutter, while helping to illuminate facial features and reduce fear of crime.
- 4.5.15 This will respond positively to the Secured by Design requirement that lighting is illuminates all elevations containing a doorset, car parking and footpaths leading to dwellings.
- 4.5.16 The detailed lighting design will be confirmed at the detailed design stage.
- 4.5.17 The applicant will adhere to the required standards as stated in section 59 of the Homes 2019 guidance

### ***Intruder alarms***

4.5.18 Intruder alarms will not be included in dwellings as standard, and will be provided at the discretion of the occupier.

### ***Recommendations***

4.5.19 As per the Homes 2019 guidance Section 60, where an intruder alarm system is installed then it shall meet the requirements of BS EN 50131 (wired and wire free systems). All installations shall be in accordance with the current electrical regulations. If an immediate police response is required, then installers must meet the requirements of the National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) police document – *Guidelines on Police Requirements & Response to Security Systems* which can be obtained from [www.securedbydesign.com](http://www.securedbydesign.com).

## 5 CONCLUSION

- 5.1.1 The proposal is for the redevelopment of the site for residential led development, including 277 No. residential units (Use Class C3) and 2,034sqm of commercial floorspace, with associated infrastructure and landscaping.
- 5.1.2 The proposed development is consistent with the principles set out in the NPPF, the Manchester City Council local policy and guidance, and the Homes 2019 and Commercial Developments 2015 guidance produced by Secured by Design by promoting an inclusive and safe development, with safe and accessible environments where crime will not undermine community cohesion.
- 5.1.3 The site visit (Chapter 2) identifies the existing safety and accessibility at the site by studying the site and its surrounding area. Its evidence illustrates the need to regenerate the site with a safe and secure development, and the subsequent chapters emphasise the opportunity presented by this proposal's positive design features, which will help to create a residential-led, mixed use development that uses attractive layout and design to animate public space and prevent the impact of crime or the fear of crime.
- 5.1.4 The positive design features are set out in Chapter 4 and include the layout of the proposed development, together with the public and private spaces, planting schemes and communal areas.
- 5.1.5 Views to and from dwellings and commercial units, and the movement network hierarchy through the development will aid surveillance. The detailed design of both the residential and commercial properties will also benefit from the use of robust materials with security features, including locks on windows and doors so to discourage breaking and entering and criminal damage.
- 5.1.6 The detailed design for the proposed development responds well to the opportunity to regenerate the rundown Brunswick Mill and adjacent vacant site by creating a safe and secure new development. The scheme promotes the key points of national and local policy, as well as the Secured by Design Homes 2019 and Commercial Developments 2015 guidance in the context of its location with boundaries of a mixture of residential units, Ashton Canal, and industrial uses.

## APPENDICES



## **Appendix 1**

Recorded Crime Incidents by Month, July 2018 to June 2019

## APPENDIX 1

The below charts show the monthly breakdown of data provided in Table 3.1 of the Crime Impact Statement report for recorded crimes from July 2018 to June 2019.




Figure A1.1 – Recorded Crime Incidents for July 2018




Figure A1.2 – Recorded Crime Incidents for August 2018




Figure A1.3 – Recorded Crime Incidents for September 2018




Figure A1.4 – Recorded Crime Incidents for October 2018




Figure A1.5 – Recorded Crime Incidents for November 2018






Figure A1.6 – Recorded Crime Incidents for December 2018



**Figure A1.7 – Recorded Crime Incidents for January 2019**



**Figure A1.8 – Recorded Crime Incidents for February 2019**




Figure A1.9 – Recorded Crime Incidents for March 2019






Figure A1.10 – Recorded Crime Incidents for April 2019




**Figure A1.11 – Recorded Crime Incidents for May 2019**



**Figure A1.12 – Recorded Crime Incidents for June 2019**

## DRAWINGS





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DO NOT SCALE  
 Work to annotated dimensions only.  
 Read drawing in conjunction with relevant specification,  
 Structural Engineers' and Services Engineers' drawings.  
 Confirm all dimensions before commencement of any  
 work on site or fabrication.

revisions + notes:  
 REV. P3 02/03/2021  
 REV. P4 10/03/2021

Boundary adjusted. Extent of outbuilding demolition in NE car park amended  
 Plant rooms updated in line with Clancy layouts issued 08/03/2021

client:  
 MARYLAND SECURITIES

date:  
 FEBRUARY 2021

project:  
 BRUNSWICK MILL DEVELOPMENT

scale:  
 1:500 @A1  
 1:1000 @A3

drawn by:  
 TG


title:  
 SITE WIDE DEVELOPMENT PLAN  
 GROUND LEVEL

drawing number:  
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status:  
 PLANNING

job number:  
 0586

revision:  
 P4






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**revisions + notes:**  
 REV. P3 01/03/2021 Apartment numbering added  
 REV. P4 02/03/2021 Boundary amended to match Land Registry plan

DO NOT SCALE  
 Work to annotated dimensions only.  
 Read drawing in conjunction with relevant specification,  
 Structural Engineers' and Services Engineers' drawings.  
 Confirm all dimensions before commencement of any  
 work on site or fabrication.



**client:** MARYLAND SECURITIES  
**date:** FEBRUARY 2021  
**project:** BRUNSWICK MILL DEVELOPMENT  
**scale:** 1:200 @A1  
**drawn by:**  
**title:** NEW BUILD RESIDENTIAL LEVEL 6 PLAN  
**drawing number:** L(-)106  
**status:** PLANNING  
**job number:** 0586  
**revision:** P4

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