



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

White Lion Public House, Stockport

Leisure (571m²)

for: Stockport Leisure Ltd

version A: 22nd July 2021

URN: 2008/0685/CIS/03

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

White Lion Public House, Great Underbank, Stockport

2008/0685/CIS/03

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Major Design Changes Not Required

This development has been assessed using the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' in order to identify any opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. In general the proposed scheme has been found acceptable, but further consideration of some aspects is advised, as stated in section 3.3 of this report.

Please note: The long term integrity of security arrangements for the site and its users will largely be dependent on effective and sustained management of the premises, as highlighted in section 6 of this report.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Michael Craig', with a stylized flourish at the end.

Michael Craig *DipLD CMLI*

DfS Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site is a prominent corner location in Stockport town centre, within the main retail zone and very close to the Merseyway Shopping Centre. The local streets are semi-pedestrianised with restricted access for vehicles.

Access to the rear service yard is shared with the neighbouring residential, retail and commercial premises – gates appear to be left open at all times, allowing unrestricted entry to this area. Irregular building footprints, recessed doorways and waste bins provide some cover for criminal or antisocial behaviour.

There are a number of other cafes and licensed premises in the vicinity of the site which have outdoor seating areas on the streets. Licensed premises can generate alcohol-related disorder incidents, particularly in the evenings.

The ground and basement levels of the premises are currently unoccupied. The upper floors have been converted to apartments, accessed off Deanery Way.



The building occupies a prominent corner location



Street furniture in front of the site




Outdoor seating is used by local cafes and bars



Section of service area behind premises



Access to rear service area is shared with neighbouring premises



Gates to rear service yard are usually left open

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 to 30th June 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
6	38	106	319	136	43	7	69	25	40

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate for the local area is relatively high with less serious wounding, theft and vehicle crime being the highest recorded offences taking place. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings are taking place throughout the local area, with a higher concentration to the north east of the proposed site, around Little Underbank and Market Place. Assaults have mostly been carried out by unknown offenders, with the majority of offences taking place in the late evening and early hours of the morning, when licenced premises in the area are closing. Alcohol consumption has been a common factor in assault and public order offences.
- 2.1.3 Thefts in the area have mostly occurred in the main shopping precinct, Merseyway. The most common M.O's (modus operandi) have been pickpocketing and grabbing/ distraction thefts, with mobile phones and purses / wallets being the most stolen items.
- 2.1.4 The highest reported vehicle crime has been theft from a motor vehicle, with the most common M.O being smashed glazing in order to gain access to the vehicle and steal contents from within, as well as the removal of vehicle registration plates. Vehicles targeted have mostly been parked in private carparks and left secure for long periods of time, creating low risk opportunities for offenders.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Posing as a legitimate customer and gaining access to restricted areas by means of tailgating employees / exploiting insecure access points.

Possible Solution – Staff-only areas should be effectively separated, both visually and physically, so that customers cannot readily gain entry. This can be achieved by the use of access-controlled doors or barriers, but they should create a clear distinction so that any intruder can be more easily identified. There should be provision within the staff only areas for the secure storage of personal belongings while at work.

- 2.2.2 Forcing open secure windows and doors (mostly to the front of the property) using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access.

Possible Solution - Security-certified door sets have resisted a series of professional attacks (using a variety of tools) including to the door itself, the frame, the locks and the fittings (see section 4). They are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Access should be restricted to any hidden elevations of the building, where any doors could be attacked unseen from the street.

- 2.2.3 Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.

Possible Solution - All ground floor / accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within / directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

- 2.2.4 Forcing open shutters using implements in order to gain access to windows and doors.

Possible Solution - Any shutters should be certified to LPS 1175 SR2. Shutters should be mounted integrally, so that boxes are less vulnerable to tampering. Use of shutters in more concealed areas,

where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed or detected, should be of a higher security certification, or consider use of additional protection such as internal security blinds or grilles.

2.2.5 Theft of personal property, particularly from table tops, from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables

Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' (see below) to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats. The internal layout of the premises can also increase surveillance opportunities and help deter offenders. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.






2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence / conflict
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery / wounding of patrons leaving premises
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against licenced premises, recorded in the Stockport area.





2.4.1 **Day / Time Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at licensed premises in Stockport peaks on Monday. The risk of burglary peaks in the early hours of the morning, this is when premises are likely to be closed or are closing (with staff leaving the building), meaning that premises are less likely to be supervised and offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without gaining attention.

2.4.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.
- Forcing open shutters using implements in order to gain access to windows and doors located beneath.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and gaining access to restricted areas by means of tailgating employees / exploitation of insecure doors.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.
- Gaining access to the roof and using tools remove tiling, gaining access to the building.

2.5 Theft (Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis




The data below relates to thefts within / against licenced premises, recorded in the Stockport area.



- 2.5.1 **Day / Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Stockport licensed premises peaks over the weekend. On these days, many premises experience higher levels of attendance than during the working week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunity for offenders to commit theft is greater. The risk of theft peaks late at night and into the early morning. This reflects the times when licensed premises are at their busiest and therefore the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses, wallets and phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items - usually stolen from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables. Theft of property belonging to staff is also common, with offenders posing as legitimate customers to gain access to unauthorised areas.

2.6 Non-Domestic Burglary (Restaurants / Cafés): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Stockport area.





2.6.1 **Day / Time Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at Stockport restaurant/café premises is higher on Sunday and lower on Wednesday / Thursday. During the day, the risk of burglary is highest outside of normal opening hours - particularly during the early hours of the morning, when premises are usually closed, and the areas in which they are typically located are quiet.

2.6.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Doors have been routinely forced open, particularly with tools / implements.
- Glazing with doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.
- Where entry points are unknown / legitimate, it is likely that offenders have posed as legitimate customers before targeting insecure doors, tailgating, or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas when premises are open to the public.

2.7 Theft (Restaurants / Cafés): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within / against licenced premises, recorded in the Stockport area.



- 2.7.1 **Day / Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Stockport restaurant/café premises is highest on Thursday. During the day, the risk of theft is highest in the afternoon and early evening. This reflects the times when restaurants/cafes are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Common thefts are of personal items belonging to customers and staff.

2.8 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.8.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Monday Thursday and Sunday, during the morning and into the evening (9am – 6pm.) Offenders target vehicles throughout the day as they are left unattended for long periods due to people attending work and leisure facilities. Therefore the offender perceives the risk of being caught/ identified to be lower.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development comprises refurbishment of the ground and basement of the former public house building, which will operate as a licensed bar / restaurant with customer access from the existing entrance at the corner of Deanery Way and Great Underbank. There will be a small service area at the rear of the building. External seating in front of the premises is proposed.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development makes a positive use of a building that has been partly vacant for a considerable period and has previously been subject to minor acts of criminal damage and other abuse. Regular legitimate use of the proposed facility will bring additional vitality and could help to improve informal policing of the area.
- 3.2.2 Customer Toilets. These have been located away from the entrance, reducing the possibility of misuse and opportunities for bilking.
- 3.2.3 The main entrance for customers & users of the bar is in an obvious location and is readily apparent on approaching the building. Customers will easily be able to identify the appropriate access point and have no justification for being present in private areas.
- 3.2.4 The position of the ground floor bar allows staff to monitor people entering and leaving the building via the main entrance.

3.3 Further Recommendations to Improve Security

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Separation of functions in rear yard. There should be no shared facilities between the residents and commercial users, their staff and customers. There should be no use of this area by customers of the bar / restaurant (including smokers). The effective operation and maintenance of the entrance gates off Deanery Way is important to the security of this development and neighbouring premises. The developer should engage with other interested parties to ensure it is kept in working order and used appropriately by residents and staff.
- 3.3.2 The proposed external seating area should be clearly overlooked from within the premises, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour more easily. Where the architecture of the building prevents this, additional surveillance such as CCTV should be used to provide effective supervision of the outdoor seating and tables. It is strongly recommended that furniture should be located inside when the premises is closed. Use of permanently-located shelters is not supported, as they are likely to generate antisocial behaviour.
- 3.3.3 In order to discourage criminal damage and other nuisance in the vicinity of residential premises measures to secure external seating should be provided to enable managers to implement the most appropriate storage method, depending on prevailing circumstances. Seating must be capable of being stacked and secured outside, and / or removed to an enclosed storage location within the premises.
- 3.3.4 External seating should be arranged so it does not obscure clear passage of pedestrians on the street, and there should be a low removable barrier should be included to separate the seating area. This helps to deter opportunistic thieves from accessing valuable items left on tables.
- 3.3.5 Sight lines (internal). It is important that the passages / stairs used by customers are well lit and should contain reflective surfaces (e.g. mirrors) in order to improve visibility, particularly at right angled corners – this will allow customers and staff to have a better view of who else is around and detect potential malingers.
- 3.3.6 The application does not involve fundamental physical changes to the building. As such the success of the proposal will be dependent on effective management of the premises and a zero tolerance policy should be adopted with customers who behave inappropriately (see section 5).

4 Physical Security

The proposed development comprises conversion of an existing building, and thus the potential to make alterations and upgrade its physical security is to some extent constrained by the existing structure. The following recommendations are made on this understanding and should apply to all new and replacement features introduced as part of the proposed development. If the identified security risks cannot be addressed by design solutions, the protection of the building and its occupants / users will be dependent on effective management and deployment of an on-site security presence and / or monitored alarms / CCTV.

All new-build elements should be constructed in accordance with the following standards to demonstrate a level of physical security acceptable to Design for Security.

4.1 Doors

- All external doors and the doors to rooms where cash is stored must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS:24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- Doors used for deliveries, and any shutters that may be used to protect these entrances when not in use, should include a vision panel or door viewer to enable staff to identify visitors prior to allowing entry.
- All back-of-house / staff areas should also not be publicly accessible. Internal doors to storage rooms, staff rooms and offices should be solid-core and self-closing - fitted with auditable access controls (i.e. proximity readers or swipe cards) or secured with keys (carried by staff only if required for duties and accounted for at all times).

4.2 Windows

- Any new windows should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, where possible. Any full height windows should take into account the requirements of the standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions.
- Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- All shutters must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required), and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. All shutters should have contacts fitted and be linked to the alarm system.

4.3 Glazing

- Any new external glazing must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P4A under EN 356.
- Where ground floor and accessible windows are not being replaced, a secondary glazing panel should be installed that meets the above security standard.
- Any secondary glazing installed to existing windows should utilise a product approved by Secured by Design (see www.securedbydesign.com for details of suppliers / installers).

4.4 Alarms

- An intruder alarm should be installed linked to contacts on all external doors and shutters; PIR detectors should cover any rooms with windows. The alarm signal should terminate at a recognised Alarm Receiving Centre. The alarm system should incorporate personal attack buttons for the use of staff in identified locations, such as behind the bar and in the cash office. The office should contain a telephone and a mobile phone with a clear signal.

4.5 Access Controls

- Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following areas / doors should operate on access control:
 - Doors separating public and staff-only areas
 - Gates into service yard

4.6 Boundaries

- Any secure boundary treatments should generally be 2400mm high and be formed of Secured-by-Design approved railings or weldmesh fencing.

4.7 Lighting

- All lighting sources should be compatible with requirements of any CCTV system installed.
- Internal lighting should be used to create the right atmosphere. Striking a balance, which avoids being so dim as to prevent staff from seeing all that is going on, but not so bright that the light is glaring, 'cold', and unwelcoming.
- An override is required, within easy reach of bar staff, so that if an incident occurs the lighting level can be raised. High-level house lighting is an important element of control. This will also help at the end of trading so that staff can see to clear up, and patrons have no doubt that its closing time.
- Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell / daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.8 CCTV

- Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to complement the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an *acceptable standard* that will allow for *identification* of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- *Acceptable Standard* - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- *Identification* – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are '*Overview*' and '*Recognition*', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [the main entrances](#), [external elevations of the building](#), [service yard](#), [stairs](#), [doors separating customer circulation from staff-only areas](#).

4.9 Other

- The opening hours of the bar / restaurant should be consistent with other similar premises in the area. Sufficient levels of service staff should be provided at busy periods to reduce waiting times and the potential for frustration, aggression and conflict.
- Extraction systems. The premises should be designed with efficient ventilation / extraction systems capable of reducing temperatures and providing sufficient ventilation without the need for staff or customers to open service doors (to the side or rear of the premises) that could undermine the integrity of other security arrangements.
- Any bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development. Bin stores should not be located in publicly-accessible areas.
- Metal theft from buildings is a significant issue in the area. Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction of the buildings, and concealment / securing of cabling.
- Graffiti on surfaces. This kind of abuse is particularly prevalent in the vicinity of the site. Expanses of blank wall exposed to public areas should be formed of a graffiti-resistant surface or have a resistant coating applied at the outset to enable easy removal of any unauthorised markings.

5 Further Guidance on Layout of Café / Bars

- All back-of-house / staff-only areas should not be publicly accessible and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.
- Cash kept on the premises should be stored securely within an office. A safe certified to LPS 1183 will provide a good level of security. The safe should be time delayed to no less than 5 minutes; appropriate signage should be displayed as a deterrent in order to make potential offenders aware of the time delay.
- Any cash office should have solid masonry walls, no adjacent false / suspended ceilings and a security-certified door-set. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys / passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.
- Any cycle stores must be fitted with a fob-activated electronic locking system with access restricted to genuine cyclists only. The doors/gates should include a self-closing hinge / door closer, which automatically locks the door / gate upon closure. Securely-anchored stands should be fitted within the cycle store (see www.securedbydesign.com for recommended suppliers).
- The internal layout the premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility. Clear views should also remain from the premises through to the public highway, i.e. large promotional signs and menus should not obstruct views.
- Consideration should be given to high/wide bars / service counters, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of any bars/service counters should be prevented (e.g. with a lockable hatch that cannot be easily scaled).

6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to

ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff and residents should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.

- 6.1.2 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter and graffiti removal to ensure that the site remains in good repair.
 - Regular inspection, service and repair to communal security features (lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV, alarms, fencing & gates)
 - Ensure that the site management is for which the building / site was designed able to cope with the remains in place, such as 24 hour concierge / security patrols.
- 6.1.3 Information regarding security features (such as specifications of windows / doors and systems performance) should be conveyed to the ultimate owners or managers of the site to ensure that any future replacements continue to provide the same level of security and maintain any security accreditation for the development.
- 6.1.4 Licensed premises and restaurants can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:
- **Opportunities** - Large numbers of people congregating bars / restaurants generates opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons are stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.
 - **Lack of attention** - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.
 - **Cohesion** – Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent bars / restaurants means that such a venue would lack ‘community territoriality’ (i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them). This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur.
 - **Customer turnover** – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
 - **Valuable goods** – Often available and possibly on show, a particular problem in external seating areas. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – such as mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys, MP3 players etc.
 - **Stealth** - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.
- 6.1.5 In order to minimise these issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:
- The main entrance to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access / egress and avoid potential conflicts arising.
 - Customers entering / leaving the premises through the main entrance should be easily observed by staff. Staff should also have clear views of any WCs to monitor their use.
- 6.1.6 The pavement license holder will need to ensure that the management team of the business to which the pavement license is attached; register and successfully complete the nationally recognised counter terrorism training product referred to as ACT E Learning within 10 days of the notification of the grant of the Pavement License OR can demonstrate that the ACT E Learning product has successfully been completed within the preceding 12 months and that all staff employed by OR at the premises complete the ACT E Learning within a reasonable period not exceeding 3 months from the notification of the grant of the Pavement License.(Act E Learning certificates are provided on successful on-line completion).
- 6.1.7 The Pavement License holder will need to ensure that existing CCTV systems are correctly working, are compliant with the Data Protection Act 1998, Information Commissioners requirements and any other local CCTV Code of Conduct produced by the Police or Local Authority. Imagery must be retained for at least 28 days and images produced to a Police Officer or Local Authority Enforcement Officer upon reasonable request. Faults which render the CCTV system or parts of it inoperable should normally be rectified within 24 hours.

7 Construction

- 7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

Appendix

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
09/06/2021	Paul Butler Associates	CIS instruction received
10/06/2021	Paul Butler Associates	Commission confirmed / fee agreed
05/07/2021	Stockport leisure LTD	Receipt of payment
14/07/2021	Paul Butler Associates	Site visit
19/07/2021	Paul Butler Associates	Additional information received
22/07/2021	Paul Butler Associates	CIS version A issued.

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
WL-01-02	Ground Floor Plan Proposed	May 21	7
WL-01-04	Basement Floor Plan Proposed	May 21	5
WL-01-05	Plan of Main Entrance Existing	May 21	
WL-01-06	Plan of Main Entrance Proposed	May 21	
WL-01-07	Section AA of Main Entrance Existing	May 21	
WL-01-08	Section AA of Main Entrance Proposed	May 21	
WL-01-09	Part Section AA of Main Entrance Proposed	May 21	
WL-01-10	Section BB of Main Entrance Existing	May 21	
WL-01-11	Section BB of Main Entrance Proposed (Doors Closed)	May 21	
WL-01-12	Section BB of Main Entrance Proposed (Doors Open)	May 21	
WL-01-13	Section CC of Main Entrance Existing & Proposed	May 21	
WL-01-15	Rear Elevation Existing	May 21	
WL-01-16	Rear Elevation Proposed	May 21	
WL-01-17	Rear Elevation Existing Showing Lightwell	May 21	
WL-01-18	Rear Elevation Proposed Showing Lightwell	May 21	
WL-01-19	Front Elevation Existing	May 21	
WL-01-20	Front Elevation Proposed Showing Bench Seats	May 21	
WL-01-21	Front Elevation Proposed Showing Planters	May 21	
	Bench visuals (x 3)		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door / window assemblies.

A performance standard for door-sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door-set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door-sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a

6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB / PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk