



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Full planning application for the erection of a retirement development consisting of 72no. independent living apartments with ancillary support services and communal facilities, along with 10no. open-market, semi-detached, town houses, together with associated landscaping, amenity space and car parking

AT 237 Didsbury Road, Heaton Mersey, Stockport

FOR: Anwyl Partnerships

Greater Manchester Police

VERSION A: 28.06.22

designforsecurity

2020/0181/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported

We welcome the investment in housing in Stockport and are happy to support the application.

The site is located in a neighbourhood with a moderate volume of recorded crime, although the burglary rate and targeting of houses around the edges of the site does raise some concerns. However, given the constraints of the site, the development is well-laid out from a crime prevention perspective and the mix of housing appropriate. Advice is included in the report, which we consider will enhance security of the development and this set out in sections 3.3 and 4. The principal recommendations are summarised as follows:

Site

- including measures to prevent parking on the pavement and in the cycle lane on Didsbury Road
- ensuring the western boundary is appropriately secure
- considering a high-quality streetscape and ensure communal areas including roadside verges are maintained appropriately

Houses

- reconsider the installation of French doors on the Didsbury Road elevation
- ensure the security qualities of the doors, windows frames, and glazing meets the SBD standard
- consider creating the inclusion of a distinctive, high-quality surface material to the drive-ways;
- install appropriate boundaries to the front and rear of the houses to give clarity of ownership and management of landscaped spaces and driveways

Apartments

- ensure the security qualities of the apartment entrance doors, garden access doors, refuse store doors, windows frames, and glazing meets the SBD standard
- install SBD standard, self-closing, self-locking communal entry doors that are fitted with remote access controls, and an audio link from the entrance doors to each apartment and staff offices
- define the edges of the apartment site with a suitable fence/railing/hedge
- install a modest CCTV system to allow staff to monitor appropriate areas of the development
- consider how mail will be delivered and distributed to residents
- consider installing a secure cycle store.

We are happy to support the proposals, subject to the developer addressing each of the recommendations, and will request of Stockport Planning the inclusion of conditions that will address any outstanding issues, as well as a condition requiring the development to achieve Secured by Design accreditation (see section 4 specification).

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1 The Site and Surroundings

The photographs and plan, below, show the development site and its surroundings. This 1.3-hectare site, edged in red on the plan, is located on the south side of the A5145, Didsbury Road, in Heaton Mersey. Didsbury Road is heavily trafficked throughout the day, particularly in the morning peak; it connects the A34, Kingsway at Didsbury, to the west, with Stockport town centre and junction 1 of the M60, to the east. The neighbourhood is residential in character a mixture of modern and pre- and post-war family housing. The modern housing estate immediately west of the site, access to which is gained via a light-controlled junction at the Didsbury Road/Briars Mount junction, comprises a mix of detached and semi-detached houses laid out in a series of culs-de-sac, which include Masefield Drive and Tennyson Close. The rear garden boundaries of several of the houses on these two streets abut the boundary of the development site. Access to the estate can also be gained via public footpath that connects Didsbury Road with Masefield Drive and Tennyson Close, part of the path passes through the western fringe of the site. The long, rear gardens of two-storey flats that face Bramley Crescent and the side boundary to number 234 Didsbury Road, a bay-fronted, early 20th century, semi-detached house, adjoin the eastern boundary of the site. A series of large, semi-detached houses face the northern boundary of the site across Didsbury Road.

Looking east along Didsbury Road with the site on the right and family housing overlooking the site on the north side of the road



The entrance to the site on Didsbury Road at the north-western corner and boundary wall



The vacant school buildings viewed from Didsbury Road



Looking north towards the school buildings and southern boundary of the site from Tennyson Avenue



Family housing on the north side of Tennyson Close



The sloping public footpath that connects Didsbury Road to, *inter alia*, Masefield Close



The development site itself comprises the site of the Focus School, an independent, primary school, and its associated grounds, as well as an area of wooded land on the western edge, through which the public footpath passes. The site falls steeply from north to south and less steeply, from west to east. The school buildings are located in the northern half of the site, and include a cluster of one, two, and three-storey buildings. The school relocated in 2019, and the buildings are now vacant. There is an area of hardstanding around the buildings, principally on the north side, that was used for outdoor play, car parking and for pupil drop-off. A grassed, outdoor play space is on the southern side of the school buildings. Pedestrian and vehicle access into the site is gained from Didsbury Road via one of two gated entrances; one is located at the north-western corner of the site, once the school entrance gate, and the other at the north-eastern corner, formerly the exit. Large concrete blocks have been placed on the inside of the gate to deter trespassers in vehicles forcing entry onto the site. The Didsbury Road boundary is defined by a brick wall of around 1800mm in height, whilst the southern, eastern, and western boundaries are defined by trees and hedges, or by welded-wire mesh or timber fencing.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st February 2021 & 31st January 2022. Neighbourhood crime relates to offences committed within 500m of the site. The data used is correct to within +/-8% due to updates with I.T systems

2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood around the site

All crime

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Use, or threat, of violence	Theft including shoplifting	Robbery	Drug offences	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
45	<5	21	135	19	0	<5	23	6	<5

2.1.1 There were 257 recorded crimes in the neighbourhood around the development site during the period analysed.

2.1.2 The most common crimes recorded were:

- Crimes involving the use, or threat, of violence - 53%
- Domestic and commercial burglaries - 19%
- Vehicle crime - 11%
- Criminal damage - 8%
- Theft (including bicycle theft, robbery, and shoplifting) - 8%

2.1.3 This breakdown of offences is typical of a suburban largely residential neighbourhood, although the proportion of burglaries is higher than many suburban areas in Stockport.



2.1.4 There were three incidents where offenders entered the site (recorded as burglary) and caused damage to property and the school buildings.

2.1.5 The streets experiencing the greatest volume of crime (10 offences or more) were:


- Didsbury Road – 43 offences
- Craig Road/Close - 30 offences
- Crescent Park – 16 offences
- Bodens Hill Road – 16 offences
- Bramley Crescent – 11 offences

Domestic burglary

2.1.6 There were 45 burglaries committed within the neighbourhood during the period analysed. The streets with the most incidents of burglary were Didsbury Road (5 burglaries) and Moorside Road (4). There were 3 burglaries carried out at houses on the modern estate west and south of the site, including Briars Mount, Masefield Drive and Tennyson Close, and 2 incidents on Bramley Crescent immediately east of the site.




2.1.7 The risk is greatest in the early part of the week before reducing in the middle of the week and rising again towards the weekend. The most common time for offences to occur is in the early hours of the morning (03:00 – 05:00).



2.1.8 Doors were most frequently targeted. Offenders forced entry by snapping the locks on the front door (typically using mole-grips), kicking the door the door open or smashing a glazed panel before reaching in and releasing the lock. Offenders also targeted windows forcing the frame open or breaking the glass.

Vehicle crime



2.1.9 There were 29 vehicle-related crimes; largely theft from a vehicle. Offenders have removed registration plates and catalytic converters as well as items from within a vehicle.



2.1.10 The risk of vehicle crime is greatest in the early and middle part of the week and the most common time for such incidents to occur is at night.


2.2 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Stockport, Greater Manchester, and England & Wales

The rates below relate to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2020.



2.2.1 The rate of burglary per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **43% higher** than the Stockport rate, **35% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **94% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.2.2 The rate of wounding crimes per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **33% higher** than the Stockport rate, **28% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **23% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.



2.2.4 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **44% lower** than the Stockport rate, **62% lower** than Greater Manchester rate and **44% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.2.5 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **23% lower** than the Stockport rate, **41% lower** than the Greater Manchester rate and **2% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.3 Typical modus operandi used in committing burglary & theft at houses and apartments in Stockport, & measures to reduce vulnerabilities

2.3.1 Communal entrance doors and apartment doors were targeted when left unsecured by residents.

To minimise the risk of offenders tailgating through communal doors or entering apartments through unsecured doors:

- communal entry doors should be self-closing and lock securely upon closure;
- install a secondary set of secure doors (air-lock/secure lobby), also self-closing and self-locking;
- install lifts that are operated by an access control system;
- install CCTV cameras in the entrance lobby;
- employ a concierge; and,
- apartment doors should be self-closing with a thumb turn lock on the inner side that meets fire regulations, with clear, yet discreet, permanent instructions on the door to inform the resident that the door is not secure until the lock is turned.

2.3.1 Doors and windows have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors and windows:

- all external doors and windows should be certified to PAS 24 security standard - PAS 24 rated doors and windows are very difficult to force open;
- internal doors to staff-only rooms should be fitted with suitable locks and self-closing mechanisms that ensure the door locks automatically upon closure;
- defensible space should be provided to the front of a building. A degree of separation between public and private space can act as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are then less willing to cross from public to clearly defined private space. Such boundary definition can also reduce the risk of criminal damage to property;
- gardens should be enclosed with appropriately high fencing and a locking gate, so that rear doors and windows are only accessible to residents (staff); and,
- all external doors should be illuminated by dusk-to-dawn lighting.

2.3.2 Glazing in doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry or commit criminal damage

To minimise the risk of offender smashing glazing in doors and windows:

- laminate glass should be fitted to all external doors and to all windows on the ground floor of the development;
- windows should be fitted with locks and opening restrictors; and,
- access to private amenity space should be restricted by installing high fencing and locking gates.

2.3.3 Breaking into garden sheds using force to gain entry.

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing entry into garden sheds:

- shed doors should be fitted with a Sold Secure™ hasp and staple, which is coach-bolted through the frame, and secured with a Sold Secure padlock.

2.3.4 Offenders have stolen bicycles

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting bicycles:

- secure cycle parking should be provided at each house;
- a cycle store should be provided within a secure part of the apartment site;
- CCTV should monitor activity in and around cycle stores; and,
- PIR lighting should be installed to illuminate the cycle stores.

2.3.5 Vehicles were targeted when parked on driveways, in unsecured car parks or on the 'street'

To minimise the risk of vehicle-related crime:

- car parking should be located on a gated driveway within the boundaries of the property where it can be supervised by its owner; and,
- car parking should be located within the boundaries of the development, or within an area that is both very secure, well-overlooked by staff and residents or monitored by an effective CCTV system. Consideration should be given to installing automatic vehicle gates and fencing around communal car parks.

2.3.6 Offenders have damaged boundary fencing

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting fencing:

- fence panels should be especially robust when they are exposed to the public realm.

2.3.7 Theft of plant and machinery, and criminal damage during the construction period.

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting the construction site:

- a secure boundary should be erected around the site;
- access should be restricted to contractors and authorised visitors;
- security staff should patrol or visit during non-working hours;
- lighting and CCTV should be installed to illuminate and record activity;
- at the end of the working day, plant and machinery should be suitably arranged to prevent forced access onto the site and theft; and,
- plant and machinery should be fitted with tracking devices.

2.4 Environmental features that can influence crime patterns

2.4.1 Features of the physical environment can influence patterns criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether or not to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

2.4.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder at the site are as follows:

- the site is located within an area with a reasonably low volume of recorded crime;
- crime analysis suggests that care homes are rarely targeted by offenders;
- the site is largely enclosed with high walls, and fences;
- housing around the periphery of the site means that more than half of the site boundary is inaccessible from public land;
- there is some overlooking of the site by residents of the houses surrounding the site, particularly across Didsbury Road and from the rear of houses that face Tennyson Avenue;
- the site is very visible from Didsbury Road. Should they witness inappropriate activity, passing pedestrians and drivers may be inclined to report it, and their presence may deter offenders; and,
- the local environment is of a reasonably good quality; residents of such areas tend to be less tolerant of crime and anti-social behaviour and more likely to report crime and anti-social behaviour.

2.4.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder, and these include:

- the rate of residential burglary in this neighbourhood is higher than the that for both Stockport, Greater Manchester, and England and Wales;
- the site has a large boundary, parts of which are not adequately secure, given the incidents of crime at the site, and are accessible from surrounding land where an offender could gain entry to the site;
- the public footpath that passes through the western edge of the site allows offenders to approach and exploit any opportunities for crime and disorder with little prospect of being witnessed as they do so along the route. Houses adjoining the footpath have installed additional security measures to deter offenders; and,
- the site is very visible and on a well-trafficked route. Offenders are likely to notice the development as it emerges from early in the construction phase, and be aware of, and potentially exploit, any criminal opportunities.

3 Development Appraisal

3.1 The proposed development

- 3.1.1 This application seeks full planning approval for the erection of a retirement development consisting of 72no., independent-living apartments, with ancillary support services and communal facilities, along with 10no. open-market, semi-detached, town houses, together with associated landscaping, amenity space and car parking. The school buildings will all be cleared, and a new road constructed to service the development.

The houses

- 3.1.2 The houses will be arranged as five pairs of semis and located alongside the site's Didsbury Road boundary. Because of the topography of the site, each house will have accommodation set out over three floors at the front and four at the rear, to include a basement floor.
- 3.1.3 There will be an entrance door at street level on the Didsbury Road elevation as well as garden access, French doors. A 1000mm high wall and entrance gate will define the Didsbury Road boundary of each house. Front gardens will be part paved and part lawn. Houses will be set back from the road by 1000-2000mm. The significant change in level between front and rear gardens of the houses requires the construction of a retaining wall between the pairs of houses, which will restrict access along the side of each house
- 3.1.4 At the rear of the houses, there will be a lawned garden (with ground floor balcony overlooking the garden), and driveway parking spaces alongside; access to the driveways will be gained via the new road constructed to service the site. An entrance door will allow access into the basement of each house and French doors will provide direct access from the living space to the garden. Multi-folding doors will allow access to the balcony from the lounge.

The apartments

- 3.1.5 The apartment building will be erected on land south of the service road at the centre of the site. It will comprise a part-three, four-storey building with a roof top garden and contain 35 one-bedroom and 37 two-bedroom apartments. There will be a communal entrance at second floor level, on the north elevation facing the service road where, because of the level changes, a bridge will link the street to the door. There will be a second, communal entrance on the ground floor on the southern elevation facing the main car park.
- 3.1.6 As well as the communal entrance, on the ground floor there will be four means of escape doors, a reception area with inner lobby doors, staff offices, 18 apartments, plant and storerooms, and a refuse store. Apart from a series of small, store and service rooms, the first and second floors will each accommodate 23 apartments. The third floor includes the upper street level entrance, buggy store, reception and staff office, a residents' communal use room, roof top garden, and 8 apartments.
- 3.1.7 The main, 27 space, car park will be located on the south side of the building adjacent to the rear boundary fencing of the houses that face Tennyson Close. A screen hedge will separate the boundary fencing from the parking bays. There will be a further 9 parking bays, set out perpendicular to the service road and located a short distance from the third floor, communal entrance door.
- 3.1.8 The remainder of the site will be landscaped with extensive tree and shrub planting and areas of lawn. The wooded area on the western fringe of the site and the footpath that passes through it will be retained.

3.2 Features of the proposals that promote security

The development

- 3.2.1 A residential development is an appropriate use for the site given the surrounding land use.
- 3.2.2 Vacant buildings and sites often attract anti-social behaviour in the form of fly-tipping fire raising, criminal damage or graffiti. The redevelopment of the site should see an end to such activities.
- 3.2.3 There are a significant number and mix of houses and apartments within the development, which increases the likelihood of residents being from a broader age range, including young singles, older residents, and families with children. Such a mix increases the likelihood of some of the residents of the houses and apartments being present throughout the day. The presence of residents or even just visible

signs of people present - cars on driveways and car parks, lights on in dwellings, external lighting at entrance doors, for example - will help to deter offenders.

- 3.2.4 'Defensible space' is provided to the front, sides, and rear of all of the houses and the apartment building.
- 3.2.5 The landscaping of the gardens of the houses and the apartments site and introduction of street trees will enhance the quality of the local environment. Well-maintained verdant environments tend to attract less crime and anti-social behaviour.
- 3.2.6 The existing houses on the opposite side of Didsbury Road will benefit from mutual supervision of the street and opposing houses and apartments.

Apartments

- 3.2.7 The apartment building is suitably located on the site.
- 3.2.8 The development includes 36 parking spaces set out in two separate groups. The location of parking spaces for staff, visitors and residents, some distance from Didsbury Road where offenders may pass by, and overlooked by apartments, will facilitate the security of vehicles.
- 3.2.9 The proposed locations of the communal entrance doors are appropriate.
- 3.2.10 Staff offices and reception areas allow enhanced supervision of entrance doors.
- 3.2.11 Internal and external, communal, amenity spaces are included in the scheme. Such spaces allow residents to meet their neighbours and build relationships and a sense of community, which can help to maintain social and environmental standards. Where the amenity spaces allow residents views of the approaches to the building and its entrances, this can deter offenders.
- 3.2.12 Secure buggy parking is provided in the apartment building.
- 3.2.13 A refuse store is provided within the apartment building.

Houses

- 3.2.14 The houses are dual fronted with entrance doors, principal room windows and the balconies facing both Didsbury Road and/or the service road. This arrangement will help to promote street activity and natural surveillance over the public realm and neighbouring properties.
- 3.2.15 Private amenity space is provided within gardens of the houses, which can be appropriately secured with boundary fencing and gates.
- 3.2.16 The proposed in-curtilage parking arrangements for the houses, overlooked by residents will facilitate the security of vehicles.

3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the development

The site

Didsbury Road

- 3.3.1 Measure to prevent parking on the pavement and the cycle lane outside the proposed houses should be considered.

Western boundary

- 3.3.2 The western boundary of the site, where it adjoins the woodland should be secured with a particularly robust fence around 2000mm high.

Streetscape

- 3.3.3 In order to emphasise ownership, and encourage maintenance of, and play/socialising in, the street, the application of a high-quality surfacing of the service road is recommended. The creation of a shared surface/'Home-zone' design for the 'street', rather than a standard engineering solution will emphasise 'territoriality', promote 'ownership' of the 'street' amongst residents, and encourage play/socialising – all of which adds to the overall supervision of the public space and deters crime. We encourage the inclusion of such measures as: a rumble strip or raised plateaux at the entrance to the development site and at strategic places along the service road; use of a mix of ornate blockwork and a non-standard, coloured/textured tarmac; distinctive signs, identifying the name of the development and the different

elements within it; and distinctive lighting. Such measures suggest that a threshold has been crossed into a space that is more private, where one's actions may be under greater scrutiny.

Houses

House security

- 3.3.4 French doors do not seem appropriate on the Didsbury Road elevation, a particularly noisy, heavily trafficked road, where the air quality may also be poor, and where the public passes very close to the doors. Such doors increase the risk of sneak theft or burglary, with offenders gaining entry via these doors should they be unsecured or unsupervised. Consider replacing the doors with a window.
- 3.3.5 Secured by Design standard front, rear, French and multi-folding doors, window frames and glazing should be fitted.
- 3.3.6 An intruder alarm should be installed at each house.
- 3.3.7 Front and rear entrance, and French, doors should be illuminated.
- 3.3.8 For clarity for delivery staff, houses should be numbered at the front and rear.

Garden boundaries

- 3.3.9 The Didsbury Road boundary should be defined with 1000mm high walls, or dwarf walls with railing infill.
- 3.3.10 Ownership/management responsibility between plots should be clearly defined with a low fence, railing or hedge.
- 3.3.11 In order to differentiate parking bays where they adjoin those of the neighbouring house, railings or stone setts should be used to define ownership.

Apartments

Communal entrance, means of escape, plant room and refuse store doors

- 3.3.12 Both the ground and third floor, communal entrance doors should be security-rated and fitted with an audio unit that allows visitors to communicate with residents or staff prior to allowing entry, via a remote door release, to *bona fide* visitors.
- 3.3.13 External, means of escape, plant room and refuse store doors should be security-rated.
- 3.3.14 The internal door to the refuse store should be fitted with a fob-activated, electronic lock. The door should be self-closing and self-locking. Push button entry to the store is acceptable but to exit the store back into the circulation corridor, a fob must be presented to release the lock. The internal door and external doors to the plant room may be fitted with key-operated, mechanical locks.

Staff rooms

- 3.3.15 Staff-only doors should be adequately secure and fitted with electronic locks and closers.

Apartment security

- 3.3.16 Each apartment should be fitted with a security-rated entrance door with door viewer and opening limiter. Garden access doors should also be security-rated.
- 3.3.17 Ground floor windows should be security-rated, fitted with key-operable locks, and have opening restrictors fitted. Glazing in all external doors and all accessible windows should include laminate glass.

Mail delivery

- 3.3.18 Mail should be delivered to staff and then distributed by staff or held in a secure post room, awaiting collection by residents.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

Houses

- All external doors must all be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS 202 BR2, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- The front and rear entrance doors should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key when closed.
- The front and rear entrance doors should have fixed sidelights or a door viewer as well as an opening limiter fitted, so that residents can identify visitors prior to opening the door fully.
- Letter plates should be fitted to the Didsbury Road entrance doors. The plates should meet the Door Hardware Federation's Technical Standard 008 (TS 008), be fitted with deflector plate, and be located a minimum of 400mm away from the internal handle and locking hardware.

Apartments

- The front and rear communal entrance doors should be:
 - compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2;
 - include a multi-point electronic lock, (which is an integral part of the certification), capable of being operated via an electronic access control system; and,
 - self-closing and lock automatically on closure.
- An audio, and ideally visual, unit should be located at each communal entrance door to allow visitors to communicate with residents.
- Residents (and staff) should have a handset in their apartment/office to speak to (and view) visitors.
- Residents and staff should be able to operate the communal entry doors' locking mechanism remotely from within their apartment/office to allow *bona fide* visitors entry.
- Individual apartment entrance doors, including any garden access doors, must be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2. Apartment entrance doors must include a door viewer.
- Chain limiters to individual apartment entrance doors are recommended.
- The external doors to the plant room and refuse store should be compliant with, and certified to, LPS 1175 SR2.
- Staff office doors, the internal, refuse store, and storeroom doors, should be FD30 rated, fitted with a fob-activated, electronic lock, and be self-closing and lock upon closure.
- Cleaner's stores and the plant room doors may be FD30 rated, be self-closing and fitted with a BS rated, key-operated, mechanical lock.

4.2 Window frames

- Window frames that are accessible from ground level of all houses and apartments must be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, be fitted with key-operated locks, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limiting opening to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- Glazing within all external doors and all ground level windows to each house or apartment must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356.

4.4 Intruder alarms

- It is good practice to fit an alarm to each dwelling (but not essential for Secured by Design accreditation). If fitted, alarms should comply with BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems or BS 6799 for wireless systems and be linked to contacts on all external doors of each property with PIR detectors covering all ground floor rooms that have windows. Alternatively, a fuse spur should be available for residents to fit their own alarm system.

4.5 Boundaries

- The western boundary of the site should be secured with a 2000mm high, welded-wire, mesh fence.
- The Didsbury Road fronts of the houses should be defined with 1000mm high walls, or dwarf walls with railing infill.
- Rear gardens of houses should be enclosed with 1100-1500mm high, walls/railings/hedges.
- 1000-1200mm high railings should define the boundary of the apartment building.

4.6 Landscaping

- In order to promote natural surveillance, planting within the gardens of the houses, on the south side of the apartment building and along the roadside verges, should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground.

4.7 CCTV

- A modest CCTV system should be installed at the apartment building. Suitable locations for cameras are:
- the main car park at the southern edge of the site
 - the corner of each elevation allowing views of pathways and doors around the building
 - the communal entrance doors
 - entrance lobbies
 - means of escape doors
 - ground and third floor circulation corridors and cores
 - cycle store entrance door and the store itself if provided.
- Ideally, images should be monitored by staff. Images should also be recorded, and a playback/review system included in the system. CCTV equipment should be located in the secure room in the staff office.

4.8 Lighting

- External, dusk-to-dawn lighting must be provided to the external doors to the front, sides and rear of the apartment building and houses. Lights should be operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended other than in refuse and cycle stores.
- Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.

4.9 Other

- Rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- Meter cupboards should be located in ground level boxes to the front of each house.

5 Management & Maintenance

- A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address maintenance of roadside amenity areas and communal areas of the apartment site.

6 Construction

- The developer should take appropriate measures to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access into and out of the site.
- The contractor on this scheme should be a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme'.
- Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority approved.

7 Secured by Design (SBD)

- Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of housing and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact	Summary of Contact
07.02.22	Dean Fisher, Anwyl Partnerships	Request for Crime Impact Statement
15.03.22		Site visit
28.06.22	Dean Fisher, Anwyl Partnerships	Report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings:

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
7000_AHM-LMA-00-XX-DR-A-7000	Site Plan Location	25/11/21	P2
7001_AHM-LMA-00-XX-DR-A-7001	Site Plan Existing	25/11/21	P2
7002_AHM-LMA-00-XX-DR-A-7002	Site Plan Proposed	17/12/21	P3
7004_AHM-LMA-00-XX-DR-A-7004	Site Street Scenes	12/11/21	P1
7005_AHM-LMA-00-XX-DR-A-7005	Site Visualisation Axonometric 01	12/11/21	P1
7006_AHM-LMA-00-XX-DR-A-7006	Site Visualisation Axonometric 02	12/11/21	P1
7100_AHM-LMA-01-XX-DR-A-7100	Apartment GA Plans	12/11/21	P1
7101_AHM-LMA-01-XX-DR-A-7101	Apartment GA Plans	12/11/21	P1
7200_AHM-LMA-02-XX-DR-A-7200	House GA Plans	12/11/21	P1
20/31/PP/01	Landscape Strategy	18/01/22	A

In the event of any changes to the scheme, it may be necessary for Design for Security to review the recommendations made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions	Date
A		28.06.22

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock, and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing
- b) Performance of hardware
- c) Resistance to static loading
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding, or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS202 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel, and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (Learn more at www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors, and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections, and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk