



## CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

LAND OFF EGMONT STREET, MOSSLEY  
RESIDENTIAL (36 no. APARTMENTS)

FOR: Bridgewater Land and Developments Ltd.

VERSION B: 06/10/2023

REFERENCE: 2023/0412/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

---

# Land off Egmont Street, Mossley

URN: 2023/0412/CIS/01

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Minor security improvements recommended


This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Robust enclosure of the private amenity spaces to the sides/rear of buildings to deter unauthorised access (including retention of the existing dense vegetation to the steep bank at the rear of Block 2 as much as possible and no features of the retaining gabion walls that may aid climbing).
- Defensible space to car park elevations to funnel pedestrian movement away from immediately adjacent residential windows. Maximise surveillance over the parking spaces to the east of Block 1 and the site entrance.
- Robust control of access into the buildings, including a secure system for the delivery of post.
- Consideration of symbolic barrier to site entrance.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

**Please note:** Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



**Bradley Hart** MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

---

# Contents

1	Visual Audit.....	4
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	5
	2.1 Crime Summary	
	2.2 Crime Rate Comparison	
	2.3 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis	
	2.4 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis	
	2.5 General Risk Factors	
	2.6 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)	
3	Layout Appraisal.....	8
	3.1 Proposed Development	
	3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal	
	3.3 Points for Further Consideration	
4	Physical Security.....	10
	4.1 Doors & Access Controls	
	4.2 Windows	
	4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric	
	4.4 Alarms	
	4.5 Boundaries	
	4.6 Lighting	
	4.7 Landscaping	
5	Management & Maintenance.....	13
6	Construction.....	13
7	Useful References.....	13
	7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)	

## Appendix

A	Contact Register.....	14
B	Associated Documents.....	14
C	CIS Version History.....	14
D	Glossary.....	15

# 1 Visual Audit

The site lies on the north-west side of Egmont Street, where it crosses the River Tame, in the Mossley area of north-east Tameside. The site itself is currently vacant, with hard standing to the east, chain link fencing to the street frontage, a sliding gate to the adjacent industrial site and scrub vegetation/mature trees to the perimeter and the steep bank to the west.

The River Tame runs along the north-eastern boundary of the site, with a private track along it which is overgrown with scrub vegetation and is secured with high double gates along Egmont Street.

Publicly accessible canal and riverside towpaths can often be conduits for crime. They are often secluded routes lacking in natural surveillance, providing easy access/escape routes for criminals to utilise, leaving adjacent building/dwellings vulnerable to unseen unauthorised access and legitimate users remote/isolated and potentially vulnerable to being intimidated or attacked.


On the opposite side of the river from the site is a business/industrial estate, also accessed from Egmont Street. To the north, the site abuts a vacant plot of land.

To the south of the site, there are industrial premises fronting onto Egmont Street and a vehicle MOT & servicing garage and compound accessed off the unmade route of Bury Street to the west, which lies at a higher ground level. Both of these sites are enclosed with chain link fencing.

The western boundary of the site is formed by a stone wall along Bury Street, which is overlooked by a terrace of town houses on the opposite side of the street. The western portion of the site is formed by a steep bank down from the ground level of Bury Street, which is densely vegetated.

On the opposite side of Egmont Street from the site is Egmont Street playing fields, which includes play areas, football pitches and some steel containers used by a junior football team.

The nearest residential properties from the site are some distance away along Egmont Street to the north and south, leaving the site somewhat isolated. The adjacent industrial premises and playing fields are likely to generate some activity during the day, but levels of footfall, activity and passive surveillance surrounding the site are likely to be limited at night. The site also benefits from little direct overlooking.



## 2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1<sup>st</sup> September 2022 to 31<sup>st</sup> August 2023.

### 2.1 Crime Summary





Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
6	<5	31	92	13	6	<5	6	<5	<5

2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area is low and the local rate of crime (i.e. recorded crimes per 1,000 dwellings) is 32% below the average rate of crime for the Tameside division. However, the study area does include large areas of open space and industrial sites that are not densely populated and typically attract fewer crime and disorder incidents. The most prevalent types of crime have been less serious wounding and criminal damage, with the majority of recorded crime concentrated around/off the main arterial route of Manchester Road (A635) and around/off the primarily residential streets to the east of the River Tame/Huddersfield Canal.

2.1.2 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed residential development, the more detailed analysis below will look at local residential burglary and vehicle crime.

### 2.2 Crime Rate Comparison

The rates below relate to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



- 
- 2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **59% lower** than the rate for Tameside as a whole, **64% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **63% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.2 The rate of woundings (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **48% lower** than the rate for Tameside as a whole, **46% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **3% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **1% higher** than the rate for Tameside as a whole, **3% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **18% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **23% lower** than the rate for Tameside as a whole, **43% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **30% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.

## 2.3 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

*The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.*

- 2.3.1 **Day/Time Range:** There have been relatively few recorded domestic burglary crimes in the local area in the last 12 months. When analysing those that have occurred, the risk peaks on Friday. During the day, the risk peaks late at night/during the early hours of the morning - when it is dark and streets typically have lower levels of footfall, activity and natural surveillance than during the day, meaning offenders often perceive a lower risk of being witnessed or detected.
- 2.3.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:
- Doors and windows have been forced open with bodily pressure or implements to gain access.
  - Insecure doors and windows have also been exploited by offenders.

## 2.4 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

*The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.*

- 2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** Again, over the previous 12 months, there have also been relatively few incidents of vehicle crime within the research area. Of those that have occurred, offenders have targeted vehicles more often on Thursday and in the late afternoon/evening and late at night – when they perceive a lower risk of being witnessed or identified.
- 2.4.2 Vehicles parked within open, communal areas or on street, where they are easily accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners, are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked on the driveways of individual properties or within secure garages.

## 2.5 General Risk Factors

- 2.5.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:
- Domestic burglary
  - Bogus callers and distraction burglary
  - Criminal damage to property and vehicles
  - Anti-social behaviour
  - Theft of/from parked vehicles
  - Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
  - Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
  - Neighbour disputes
  - Poor maintenance of access control systems
  - Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

---

## 2.6 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.6.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent MOs used by offenders when targeting residential properties are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Doors and windows have been forced open with bodily pressure or implements to gain access.

*Possible Solution - All external doors and windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Sections 4.1 & 4.2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All individual apartments should also be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (also see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.*

- Insecure doors and windows have also been exploited by offenders.

*Possible Solution - A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to the apartment block before allowing them access (see Section 4.1). The main communal entrance to the block should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. Consideration could also be given to 'airlock' lobby system, which features a secondary entrance door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed.*

*All ground floor/accessible windows should also be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.2), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. Clearly defined defensible space between building frontages and the 'street' can provide a degree of separation between public and semi-private space and act as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are more likely to feel under observation/scrutiny from the street or overlooking properties (see Section 4.5). Such boundary definitions can also reduce the risk of criminal damage and nuisance/anti-social behaviour.*

*All private spaces to the sides/rears of apartment blocks should be robustly enclosed (see Section 4.5), particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible space, to deter unauthorised access. Open pedestrian routes/accessible land to the rear of the properties should be avoided. Lighting to the front and rear of the dwellings can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime (see Section 4.6).*

- Vehicles have been targeted for theft of, theft from and criminal damage when parked on-street or within open communal areas.

*Possible Solution - It is essential that the development is designed so that resident's vehicles are secured and overlooked. Ideally, any surface communal parking areas serving apartments or groups of houses should be located directly in front of the dwellings they serve, clearly separated from the streets or any areas of adjacent open space/pedestrian routes. Any side, rear, undercroft or basement communal parking areas must be secured with automatic gates/shutters to prevent unauthorised access to where hidden doors, windows and parked vehicles could be attacked unseen.*

---

## 3 Layout Appraisal

### 3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to erect a 2 no. 3 storey residential buildings, comprising of 12 no. apartments in Block 1 and 24 no. apartment in Block 2, with associated parking and landscaping.
- 3.1.2 The site will be served by an access road off Egmont Street. The blocks will occupy the western portion of the site and will front onto a residential car park and turning head along the riverside, with private amenity space to their rears. Communal refuse and cycles store will be located adjacent to the blocks and the parking areas serving them.

### 3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

*The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.*

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will bring additional activity, overlooking and surveillance to the area at all times of the day and night.
- 3.2.2 The buildings will have habitable room windows to their frontages, providing surveillance opportunities over the parked vehicles, any visitors to the blocks and towards the access route off the street.
- 3.2.3 The footprint of the buildings has been kept relatively simple, with no accessible doors/windows hidden within deep recesses or behind building lines (where they would be vulnerable to attack unseen).
- 3.2.4 Many of the apartments will be provided above street level, meaning that residents' possessions cannot be easily observed and unauthorised entry is more effectively deterred. This also reduces the potential impacts of any excessive noise, nuisance and anti-social behaviour (particularly at night).
- 3.2.5 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the buildings, avoiding the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the developments are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

### 3.3 Points for Further Consideration

*The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.*

- 3.3.1 The private amenity spaces to the sides and rears of the blocks should be enclosed and defined as private space by 1800-2100mm high walls, railings or close-boarded timber fencing (chain link fencing or waney lap timber fencing are not considered appropriate security fencing), to prevent unauthorised access to the hidden windows and doors that could be vulnerable to unauthorised access/attack unseen if left open and accessible (see Section 4.5 for more information). The existing dense vegetation to the steep bank at the rear of Block 2 should be retained as much as possible, in order to deter unauthorised access from Bury Street to the west, and the proposed gabion retaining walls should not have any features that may aid climbing (such as sloping, terracing or footholds etc.).
- 3.3.2 The front and east side elevations of Block 1 and the front elevation of Block 2, which include residential windows adjacent to parking areas and pedestrian routes, should be protected by some low-level defensive planting beds to provide some protection to the ground floor windows and funnel pedestrian movement away from them. If possible, the habitable room windows to the east side elevation of Block 1 should be larger to allow residents to clearly overlook the parking spaces to the east and the access route/site entrance.
- 3.3.3 The main communal entrances to the frontage of the blocks should be formed by security-certified, single-leaf doorsets, capable of being operated via a robust electronic access control system (see Section 4.1). In addition to a robust access control system for visitors, there should also be a secure system for the delivery of post that ensures access to all floors of the buildings is not required (again, see Section 4.1 for more information). The rear communal entrances to the buildings should be for the use of residents only.



- 
- 3.3.4 Given the site is somewhat isolated from nearby residential dwellings at night and the site entrance is some distance away from the buildings themselves, consideration should be given to defining the street frontage of the scheme with low-level railings and planting, with a symbolic barrier across the access route (e.g. formed by brick pillars and a change in surface colour/texture) to clearly define it as in ownership/control of the residents. This will encourage a feeling of territoriality among the residents - psychologically giving the impression that the area beyond is private and discourage anyone without a legitimate purpose from entering.
- 3.3.5 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

---

## 4 Physical Security

*The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.*

### 4.1 Doors & Access Controls

- All external doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any escape-only doors is permitted for use under the security certification of the product. Any escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- The main communal entrance doorsets to the front of each block must be security-certified to one of the above standards, including a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. They should be single-leaf, self-closing/locking and controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet callers to the buildings before allowing them access.
- Ideally, postal delivery arrangements should allow for external deposits and internal withdrawals by residents. If this is not possible, there should be a 'secure lobby' arrangement, with a secondary communal door to the same security specification as the outer door, to allow for deliveries without providing access to all floors of the building. The postboxes themselves should be certified to Door & Hardware Federation Technical Specification 009 (TS 009), with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access control system.
- Any communal doorsets to the rear of the buildings must also be security-certified to one of the above standards, be self-closing/locking and controlled by means of resident key-fob only (i.e. no visitor access).
- All individual internal apartment entrance doorsets must also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. These doors should have either a door viewer or a fixed sidelight, containing laminated glazing.

### 4.2 Windows

- Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- All ground floor and any potentially accessible first floor opening lights accessible from single-storey elements (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

### 4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- All ground floor and potentially accessible first floor glazing must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- There should be no other features of the buildings (such as projecting canopies/window cills, exposed rainwater down pipes, projecting brickwork/cladding features etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby lighting columns, handrails etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to upper floor windows.

---

## 4.4 Alarms

- Each apartment should ideally have an intruder alarm to comply with either:
  - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems; or
  - BS 6799 for wireless systems.

Alarms should be linked to contacts on all doors and PIR detectors should cover any accessible rooms with windows.

- If intruder alarms are not to be provided, there should at least be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur installed to each apartment, to allow future residents to connect an alarm if required.

## 4.5 Boundaries

- The sides and rears of the buildings should be enclosed as private amenity space for the use/access of residents only by 1800-2100mm high walls/close-boarded timber fencing/railings and gates (waney lap fencing is not considered appropriate). Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of walls and close-boarded timber fencing/railings should have panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid.

- Any pedestrian gates to the private space should be 1800-2100mm high, self-closing and self-locking. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points to any gates should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates to avoid the creation of footholds. They should also be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, lighting columns, trees etc. The gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.



- The residential windows along the front/side elevations of Block 1 and along the front elevation of Block 2, adjacent to the parking areas, should be protected by dense, low-level defensive planting beds, in order to funnel pedestrian movement away from the windows.

- The access road and parking areas serving the buildings should be separated from the adjacent private track along the River Tame by 1800mm high railings or welded-wire mesh fencing, to prevent it from being utilised as an unseen access/escape route.

- Care should also be taken to ensure there are no trees or any other hard/soft landscaping features immediately adjacent and on the publicly accessible side of any secure boundaries that could be used as a climbing aid to scale the fencing. Any such features should be pruned or removed where possible. The existing dense vegetation to the steep bank at the rear of Block 2 should be retained as much as possible, in order to deter unauthorised access from Bury Street to the west. The proposed gabion retaining walls should not have any features that may aid climbing (such as sloping, terracing or footholds etc.).

- Any external cycle stores serving the buildings should be located within the private amenity spaces described above and should themselves be enclosed with 1800-2100mm high walls, railings or fire-resistant close-boarded timber fencing and self-closing/locking, steel-framed, 'slam-to-lock' gates, which cannot be left unlocked when shut. They should include 'Sheffield' style racks (that allow residents to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand, rather than just the crossbar) or cycle storage lockers. For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: [www.designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/](http://www.designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/). The external refuse store serving the buildings should be similarly enclosed/secured. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

## 4.6 Lighting

- Lighting to parking areas should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 10, with a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

- 
- Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
  - Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

#### 4.7 Landscaping

- In vulnerable locations such as around building entrances and parking areas, any low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and any tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

---

## 5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter/graffiti removal
  - Repair to communal areas (such as access-controls, fencelines/gates, lighting, signage etc.)
  - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings. Low-level defensive planting beds can be used to great effect to funnel pedestrians away from vulnerable areas.

## 6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

## 7 Useful References

### 7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

## A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
8 <sup>th</sup> August 2023	Neil Pike Architects	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
14 <sup>th</sup> August 2023	Neil Pike Architects	Quotation issued
22 <sup>nd</sup> August 2023	Neil Pike Architects	Quotation resent
23 <sup>rd</sup> August 2023	Neil Pike Architects	Confirmation of instruction/fee & receipt of revised plans
21 <sup>st</sup> September 2023	Neil Pike Architects	Email correspondence re: report completion & payment. Plans are currently being revised – will forward on when complete
29 <sup>th</sup> September 2023	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment
2 <sup>nd</sup> October 2023	Neil Pike Architects	Version A of CIS issued
5 <sup>th</sup> October 2023	Neil Pike Architects	Receipt of revised site plan

## B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
PL K1096/01	Proposed Site Plan (SUPERSEDED)	05/07/23	-
PL K1096/01	Proposed Site Plan	14/08/23	B
PL K1096/02	Block 1 - Proposed Floor Plans, Roof Plan and Elevations (SUPERSEDED)	07/06/23	A
PL K1096/02	Block 1 - Proposed Floor Plans, Roof Plan and Elevations	14/08/23	B
PL K1096/03	Block 2 and Block 3 - Proposed Floor Plans (SUPERSEDED)	05/07/23	-
PL K1096/03	Block 2 and Block 3 - Proposed Floor Plans	14/08/23	A
PL K1096/04	Block 2 and Block 3 - Proposed Roof Plan and Elevations (SUPERSEDED)	07/06/23	A
PL K1096/04	Block 2 and Block 3 - Proposed Roof Plan and Elevations	14/08/23	B
PL K1096/05	Proposed Typical Section	05/07/23	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

## C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Minor amendments made to site plan, including gabion retaining walls to the rear of Block 2 & mesh fencing to riverside private track	06/10/23

## D Glossary

### Burglary Resistance Standards

#### BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

*An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.*

#### BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

*The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:*

- a) Resistance of glazing
- b) Performance of hardware
- c) Resistance to static loading
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

#### LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

*This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.*

#### STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

#### STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

#### BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

*A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.*

### Commonly Used Acronyms

#### CIT

*Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).*

#### CPTED

*Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design*

#### CRS

*Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)*

#### INPT

*Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.*

#### PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

*A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.*

#### LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

*A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.*

#### UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

*The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.*

### Useful Websites

#### Design for Security

[www.designforsecurity.org](http://www.designforsecurity.org)

#### Secured by Design

[www.securedbydesign.com](http://www.securedbydesign.com)

#### RIBA Product Selector

[www.ribaproductselector.com](http://www.ribaproductselector.com)

#### LPCB – Red Book Live

[www.redbooklive.com](http://www.redbooklive.com)

#### Crime Reduction (Home Office)

[www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk](http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk)

#### DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

[www.designagainstcrime.org](http://www.designagainstcrime.org)

#### Building for Life

[www.buildingforlife.org](http://www.buildingforlife.org)

#### CLG (Communities and Local Government)

[www.communities.gov.uk](http://www.communities.gov.uk)