CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

34 SANDY LANE, ROMILEY, STOKPORT

EXTENSIONS & CHANGE OF USE TO FORM 22 no. BEDROOM HMO

FOR: Views

VERSION B: 19/09/2023

REFERENCE: 2023/0045/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

CPT
CRIME PREVENTION TEAM

34 Sandy Lane, Romiley, Stockport

URN: 2023/0045/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security improvements recommended

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

Experience suggests that houses in multiple occupation tend to attract a more transient group of residents who, if not sensitively managed, can both generate and attract crime and disorder problems that may directly impact on the amenity of neighbouring residents. It is important that robust security measures and a suitable management plan have been developed and then designed into the scheme from the outset, in order to clearly demonstrate that crime and disorder issues have been considered and reasonable measures implemented to ensure that the development provides a safe and secure place for future residents.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- General boundary treatments, including secure enclosure of private garden area (with visually permeable railings where adjacent to rear car park), defensive planting between garden enclosure and adjacent alleyway and full enclosure of rear parking area to prevent unauthorised access from adjacent insecure garden space/alleyway.
- Maximise surveillance opportunities from Sandy Lane, removing any hiding places that could be exploited by offenders.
- Robust control of access into/around the property.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated into the proposed scope of work where appropriate, we would be happy to support the development.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

Contents

Appendix

1 Visual Audit

The site lies on the east side of Sandy Lane, in the Romiley area of east Stockport.

The site is currently occupied by a large, two-storey detached building previously in use as a care home. The site includes a small hard standing parking area to the frontage of the building, defined by a low walls and dense vegetation/mature trees along the street, as well as an access road/informal parking area along the northern boundary leading to a garage colony at the rear of the site. To the south side of the building is a small enclosed garden area including a single-storey outbuilding.

The surrounding area is primarily occupied by large detached and semi-detached residential properties. There are 2 no. 3 storey blocks of apartments to the immediate north of the site, which are served by the access road/informal parking area within the site and the garage colony to the rear of the site. The existing dense vegetation along the street frontages of both sites, as well as between them, means that views of, from and between them are somewhat impeded.

There is a narrow footpath route running along the southern boundary of the site that links Sandy Lane to the residential cul-de-sacs of Syke Croft and Far Ridings to the east and north-east. The boundary of the site along the route is currently formed by low walls, dense vegetation and high timber fencing, although the existing boundary treatment to the rear of the site is poorly defined and has been damaged, meaning unauthorised access to the rear of the site is possible from the route/adjacent garden space.

When open land or routes exist to the rear of sites and dwellings, they can often leave them vulnerable to unauthorised access (particularly when they benefit from little/no natural surveillance) – as they can provide easy access/escape routes for offenders to utilise unseen. Routes to the rear of dwellings can also experience nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues and can leave legitimate users intimidated/vulnerable, particularly after dark.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st February 2022 to 31st January 2023.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
12	4	11	28	6	<5	<5	<5	<5	<5

2.1.1 The general volume of recorded crime in the local area is relatively low for Stockport, with less serious wounding being the most commonly reported offence. Most recorded offences have occurred around/off Compstall Road (B6104) to the south of the site.

2.1.2 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed residential development, the more detailed analysis below will look at residential burglary and vehicle crime.

2.2 Crime Rate Comparison (Local Area)

The rates below relate to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.

Comparison of Domestic Burglary Rates at Site (km), Stockport and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Wounding Rates at Site (km), Stockport and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (km), Stockport and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (km), Stockport and Greater Manchester



2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **31% lower** than the average rate for Bolton, **29% lower** than the average rate for Greater Manchester and **27% lower** than the average rate for England & Wales.

2.2.2 The rate of woundings (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **75% lower** than the average rate for Bolton, **83% lower** than the average rate for Greater Manchester and **67% lower** than the average rate for England & Wales.

2.2.3 The rate of criminal damage (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **54% lower** than the average rate for Bolton, **66% lower** than the average rate for Greater Manchester and **58% lower** than the average rate for England & Wales.

2.2.4 The rate of vehicle crime (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **38% lower** than the average rate for Bolton, **51% lower** than the average rate for Greater Manchester and **40% lower** than the average rate for England & Wales.

2.3 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.

Domestic Burglary – Day Range



Domestic Burglary – Time Range



Domestic Burglary – Point of Entry



2.3.1 Day/Time Range: During the week, the risk of domestic burglary in the local area peaks on Tuesday. During the day, the risk peaks during the early hours of the morning, when it is dark, streets are typically quieter than during the day and offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.

2.3.2 Point of Entry: In the local area, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:

- Doors have been targeted most frequently and have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure.
- Windows have also been prised open/targeted when left insecure by residents.
- Glazing with doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.

2.4 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

2.4.1 Day/Time Range: There have been relatively few recorded vehicle crimes in the local area over the last 12 months. When analysing those that have occurred, the risk peaks on Wednesday and Saturday during the week and during the early hours of the morning and late afternoon/early evening.

2.4.2 Vehicles parked on streets or within open communal parking areas, where they are easily accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners, are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked within the curtilages of dwellings, within garages or within secure parking facilities.

2.5 General Risk Factors

2.5.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Anti-social behaviour
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Neighbour disputes
- Poor maintenance of access control systems
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.6 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.6.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting local residential properties and parked vehicles are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Doors have been targeted most frequently and have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure.

  Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.

  A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to the building before allowing them access (see Section 4.1). The main communal entrance should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. Consideration could also be given to 'airlock' lobby system, which features a secondary entrance door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed.

  All individual bedrooms should also be secured with a robust entrance doorset (see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.

- Windows have also been prised open/targeted when left insecure by residents.

  Possible Solutions - All ground floor/accessible windows should also be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), with key operated locks and opening restrictors.

  All private spaces to the sides/rear of the building should be robustly enclosed, particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible space, to deter unauthorised access. Clearly defined defensible space between the building frontage and the 'street' can a degree of separation between public and semi-private space and act as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are more likely

to feel under observation/scrutiny from the street or overlooking properties. Such boundary definitions can also reduce the risk of criminal damage and nuisance/anti-social behaviour.

- Glazing with doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.

  Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Any glazed panels in or around doors should ideally be small and set well-away from locking points.

- Vehicles have been targeted for when parked on-street or within open car parks

  Possible Solution - It is essential that the development is designed so that any resident's vehicles are secured and overlooked. Ideally, any communal parking areas serving apartments or groups of houses should be located directly in front of the dwellings they serve, clearly separated from the street or any areas of adjacent open space/pedestrian routes. Any side, rear, undercroft or basement communal parking areas must be secured with automatic gates/shutters to prevent unauthorised access to where hidden doors, windows and parked vehicles could be attacked unseen.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

3.1.1 The proposal is to erect a part first floor, part two-storey rear extension and change the use of the existing building (formerly a care home) to form a HMO, comprising of 22 no. bedrooms, with associated parking.

3.1.2 The site will feature 4 no. parking bays to the front of the building and a rear parking area for a further 3 no. vehicles. The south side of the building will be enclosed as a private garden amenity space with 2100mm high fencing and gates, which will house a secure cycle shelter for 22 no. cycles and a bin store. The ground floor of the building itself will house 2 no. communal kitchens, a communal laundry and boiler room, 2 no. communal W/Cs and 10 no. bedrooms. The first floor will house another communal kitchen, 3 no. W/Cs, a store and 12 no. bedrooms.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The proposed development will bring additional activity, overlooking and surveillance to the area at all times of the day and night.

3.2.1 There will be 22 no. bedrooms in the property, which is considered to be sufficient to provide a reasonable prospect of a presence of residents throughout the day and at the weekend, providing activity and passive supervision within the development, which can help to deter offenders from targeting the property.

3.2.2 Access controls can easily be deployed at the communal entrance door, in order to restrict access to residents and authorised visitors.

3.2.3 The communal space within the property can help build relationships between residents and develop 'social capital' within a development. There is often a more 'stable' resident base in socially cohesive developments, that is, there is less of a turnover of residents. HMOs with a high turnover of residents can often lead to crime and disorder issues.

3.2.4 Cycle and bin storage will be within the secure garden area to the south of the building.

3.2.5 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design/ construction of the scheme. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design/specification of the development can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Recommendations to Improve Security of Scheme

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 The garden area to the south side building (including the bin and cycle stores) should be enclosed with 2100mm high boundaries and lockable gates. Consideration should be given to a visually permeable boundary to the rear to allow residents to clearly overlook the rear parking bays (see illustration opposite and Section 4.4 for more information). The green area to the south of the garden, between the garden enclosure and the adjacent alleyway, should incorporate mature defensive planting to discourage loitering/gathering, damage and unauthorised access. Care should be taken to ensure that any existing or proposed trees do not inadvertently create climbing aids over boundaries to private space.



3.3.2 The car park to the rear of the building must also be fully enclosed within a 2100mm high enclosure to prevent unauthorised access from the adjacent insecure garden space/alleyway, which offenders should utilise to attack parked vehicles and escape without being noticed. Consideration should also be given to the installation of a 2100mm high vehicular gate to prevent unauthorised access to the hidden rear parking area from the access route/adjacent garage colony (see illustration above and Section 4.4 for more information). All parking areas should be adequately and uniformly lit (see Section 4.5).

3.3.3 Ideally, the vegetation along the street frontage of the site should be thinned/lowered to maximise surveillance opportunities and ensure all parked vehicles, the main entrance and all residents/visitors coming to and from it can be clearly seen from the street.

3.3.4 The main communal entrance serving the building should security-certified, self-closing/locking and fitted with secure access controls to allow residents to control access (see Section 4.1). In addition to a robust access control system for visitors, there should also be a secure system for the delivery of post that ensures access to the building is not required (again, see Section 4.1 for more information). The proposed communal door to the rear of the building should be for the use of residents only.

3.3.5 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in staff, residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

Although minimal external alterations are currently proposed, it is highly recommended that the following physical security measures are incorporated into the proposed scope of works where appropriate.

4.1 Doors & Access Controls

- ☐ Any new external doorsets (including front and rear communal doors and patio doors) should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. Any escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ The main communal entrance to the building should be compliant with and certified to one of the standards above, including a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. It should be self-closing/locking and capable of being controlled by means of an audio/video entry phone system linked to each bedroom, so that residents can vet callers to the building before allowing them access.
- ☐ There should be a secure system for the delivery of post without needing to provide access to the building. Postboxes should be located externally adjacent to the main entrance. The postboxes themselves should be certified to Door & Hardware Federation Technical Specification 009 (TS 009), with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). All other deliveries should be made directly to the residents via the access control system.
- ☐ The external communal rear entrance to the building should be for the use of residents only. It should be security-certified to one of the above standards, self-closing/locking and operated by resident key/key-fob only.
- ☐ The internal doorsets to each of the bedroom units should be of robust construction (FD30 or higher), with hinge-bolts and a lock certified to BS 8621 or PAS 8621, to allow the residents to secure their own bedroom/possessions.
- ☐ Given the likely transient nature of the residents of the scheme, any resident fob/key-cards should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled by the landlord to ensure that mis-use is prevented. Any keys should be collected by the landlord (and accounted for at all times) when residents move on.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Any new ground floor windows or first floor windows potentially accessible from single-storey elements should be certificated to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Any new or retained ground floor and any first floor opening lights accessible from single-storey elements (escape requirements permitting) should be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ All new ground floor and potentially accessible first floor glazing (to doors and windows) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Boundaries

- ☐ The garden area to the south side of the building (including the cycle and bin stores) should be enclosed by 2100mm high walls or close-boarded timber fencing and gates. Where adjacent to the rear car park, the boundary should be formed by visually permeable 2100mm high railings (see Section 3.3 for illustration). Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of low walls and fencing/railing panels should have panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid.

- [ ] The rear parking area should also be similarly enclosed with 2100mm high walls or close-boarded timber fencing, returned to the rear of the adjacent garage colony, in order to prevent access from the adjacent insecure garden space/alleyway. Consideration should be given to securing the rear car park with a 2100mm high vehicular gate/s to prevent unauthorised access to where hidden vehicles could be attacked unseen (see Section 3.3 for illustration).

- [ ] All vehicular and pedestrian gates should have no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and should be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, lighting columns etc. Exposed hinges and large apertures/locking points to any gates should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. The hinges should also not provide footholds and the gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.

- [ ] The green area between the private garden and the adjacent alleyway should incorporate low-level dense defensive planting (i.e. densely branched, thorny shrubs), in order to deter unauthorised access, damage and scaling. Care should also be taken to ensure there are no trees or any other hard/soft landscaping features immediately adjacent and on the publicly accessible side of any secure boundaries that could be used as a climbing aid to scale the perimeter fenceline. Any such features should be pruned or removed where possible.

- [ ] Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.

4.5 Lighting

- [ ] Lighting to all parking areas should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 10, with a uniformity level of no less than 25%.

- [ ] Dusk ‘til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

- [ ] Fittings should produce ‘white’ light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED, metal halide or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

- [ ] Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.6 CCTV

- [ ] If a CCTV system is installed, suitable locations for cameras would be: all external doors and all parking/cycle storage areas. Images should be recorded, with recording equipment located in a secure room within the building or recorded off-site.

4.7 Landscaping

- [ ] In vulnerable locations such as around entrances, parking areas and the site frontage, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.

- [ ] Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

- [ ] Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

- [ ] There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.8 Other

- ☐ The external communal cycle shelter should ideally be secured with self-closing, ‘slam to lock’ gates (i.e. an automatic deadlocking mortice latch, key or fob operated) to ensure they cannot be left insecure. If they are fitted with a hasp and stable, they should be secured with a closed-shackle padlock to at least Sold Secure Silver standard. It should include ‘Sheffield’ style racks, or similar, that allow residents to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand, rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: www.designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/.
- ☐ A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place while retaining a secure development.
- ☐ Ideally, any meter cupboards should be capable of being read remotely or should be located to the front of dwelling only and not in the private areas, in order to deter bogus callers.

5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the HMO scheme must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All residents should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations to the landlord/facilities management team.

5.1.2 The upkeep of a residential development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter/graffiti removal
- Repair to communal areas (e.g. boundary treatments, lighting, access controls, signage etc.)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

5.1.3 Any amenity areas should be subject to an effective maintenance contract, to ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
31st January 2023	Paul Butler Associates	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
1st February 2023	Paul Butler Associates	Quote issued
3rd February 2023	Paul Butler Associates	Confirmation of instruction/fee
13th February 2023	Paul Butler Associates	Receipt of updated drawings
17th February 2023	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment
23rd to 27th February 2023	Paul Butler Associates	Email correspondence re: timescales
3rd March 2023	Paul Butler Associates	Version A of CIS report issued
15th September 2023	Paul Butler Associates	Amended plans received with request to revise CIS report

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
A1474(01)AP001	Location Plan and Existing Site Plan	25/01/23	P1
A1474(01)AP002	Existing Ground Floor Plan	25/01/23	P1
A1474(01)AP003	Existing First Floor Plan	25/01/23	P1
A1474(01)AP004	Existing Elevations	25/01/23	P1
A1474(01)AP005	Existing Elevations	25/01/23	P1
A1474(01)AP007	Existing Boundary Treatment	25/01/23	P1
A1474(02)AP001	Proposed Site Plan (SUPERSEDED)	14/02/23	P4
A1474(02)AP001	Proposed Site Plan	15/09/23	P11
A1474(02)AP002	Proposed Ground Floor Plan (SUPERSEDED)	14/02/23	P5
A1474(02)AP002	Proposed Ground Floor Plan	15/09/23	P15
A1474(02)AP003	Proposed First Floor Plan (SUPERSEDED)	27/01/23	P1
A1474(02)AP003	Proposed First Floor Plan	13/09/23	P10
A1474(02)AP004	Proposed Elevations (SUPERSEDED)	27/01/23	P1
A1474(02)AP004	Proposed Elevations	13/09/23	P5
A1474(02)AP005	Proposed Elevations (SUPERSEDED)	27/01/23	P1
A1474(02)AP005	Proposed Elevations	11/09/23	P4
A1474(02)AP006	Proposed Boundary Treatment (SUPERSEDED)	06/02/23	P1
-	Bike Shelter Specification (SUPERSEDED)	-	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Part first/part two storey rear extension added & 7 no. additional bedrooms added to previous proposal (overall 22 no. bed HMO)	19/09/23

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24
General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)
Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)
Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201
Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202
Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT
Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS
Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT
Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)
A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)
A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)
The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security
www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk