



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

220-222 WELLINGTON ROAD SOUTH, STOCKPORT
CONVERSION & EXTENSION OF HMO TO PROVIDE 25 no. BEDROOMS

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR: TP Portfolio Ltd.

VERSION A: 26/02/2024

REFERENCE: 2023/0524/CIS/02

220-222 Wellington Road South, Stockport

URN: 2023/0524/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security improvements recommended

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

Experience suggests that houses in multiple occupation tend to attract a more transient group of residents who, if not sensitively managed, can both generate and attract crime and disorder problems that may directly impact on the amenity of neighbouring residents. It is important that robust security measures and a suitable management plan have been developed and then designed into the scheme from the outset, in order to clearly demonstrate that crime and disorder issues have been considered and reasonable measures implemented to ensure that the development provides a safe and secure place for future residents.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Existing vegetation lowered/tree canopies raised to maximise surveillance opportunities from Wellington Road South and Lowfield Road, removing any hiding places that could be exploited by offenders to attack doors, windows and parked vehicles unseen.
- Given the high crime levels in the area, replacement of the existing external doors with security-certified doorsets is considered essential, with secure systems of managing visitor access and postal deliveries.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated into the proposed scope of work where appropriate, we would be happy to support the development.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site lies on the west side of Wellington Road South, between Lowfield Road to the south and Lyme Grove to the north, to the south of Stockport town centre.


The site is occupied by a pair of part single/two/three-storey properties which appear to be in HMO/residential use. The street frontages of the site are defined by low-level walls, with some mature trees and hedging in places, as well as overgrown scrub vegetation and weeds. There are informal, off-road parking areas to the side of No. 220 (accessed off Lyme Grove) and the rear of No. 222 (accessed off Lowfield Road), with large communal bins left accessible. There are currently 3 no. external entrances serving No. 220 and 2 no. external entrances serving No. 222 (some of which are in a poor state of disrepair), located to the front and side elevations of the properties. There is no enclosed private space to either property.

The dwellings front onto Wellington Road South – a wide dual-carriageway route busy with vehicular traffic and pedestrian footfall. There is a ten-storey office building directly opposite.

To the north, on the opposite side of Lyme Grove, is a single-storey Decorators Centre and car park, with car sales forecourts fronting onto Lyme Grove and Longshut Lane West. To the west of the site are semi-detached houses, terraced houses and low-rise apartment blocks fronting onto Lyme Grove and Lowfield Road. The routes are busy with on-street parking and there are some resident permit holders only restrictions in place. To the south, on the opposite side of Lowfield Road, is an apartment block fronting onto Wellington Street South (with a gated rear car park) and a Doctors Surgery.

Although the site benefits from good levels of passive surveillance from the surrounding streets and could benefit from direct overlook from nearby properties, the existing dense hedging/trees along parts of the street frontages do somewhat impede views of and from the properties and parking areas (which could leave them vulnerable to attack unseen).

To the south of the site, there are a number of commercial premises, including hot food takeaways. While such premises can provide legitimate activity and surveillance opportunities to an area, they can also often be a focal point for nuisance/anti-social behaviour issues, particularly late at night.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st February 2023 to 31st January 2024.

2.1 Crime Summary





Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
41	28	91	392	41	10	9	27	24	15

2.1.1 The general volume of recorded crime in the local area is high, particularly the levels of less serious wounding, as well as criminal damage, vehicle crime and domestic burglary. Less serious wounding have taken place throughout the local area, with particular concentrations around/off the main arterial route of Wellington Road South/Buxton Road (A6) and the primarily residential streets to the west of the site and to the north-east. Harassment, assaults and public order offences have been the most commonly recorded wounding offences taking place, often involving domestic disputes or incidents between known associates.

2.1.2 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed residential development, the more detailed analysis below will look at residential burglary and vehicle crime.

2.2 Crime Rate Comparison (Local Area)




The rates below relate to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



- 2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **15% higher** than the rate for Stockport as a whole, **18% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **21% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.2 The rate of woundings (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **63% higher** than the rate for Stockport as a whole, **12% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **114% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **84% higher** than the rate for Stockport as a whole, **38% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **67% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area **49% higher** than the rate for Stockport as a whole, **17% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **42% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.3 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of domestic burglary in the local area peaks on Monday and Wednesday/Thursday/Friday.
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk peaks in the evening. Offenders frequently target residential properties at night when it is dark and streets typically benefit from less activity, footfall, surveillance and overlooking than during the day – meaning offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected. During the evening, it is also often easier for offenders to observe when residents are away from home – meaning they can attempt to gain entry without fear of being disturbed.

2.3.3 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:

- Doors have been targeted most frequently and have either been forced open with implements/bodily pressure, or have been targeted when left insecure by residents (particularly front doors).
- There have been a number of incidents where the means of entry was unknown/legitimate – this is likely to have been when offenders have targeted insecure doors or windows unnoticed or have tailgated/posed as legitimate visitors to gain access to apartment blocks.
- Windows have been prised open by offenders to gain entry.
- Glazing within doors (particularly to the rear of properties) and windows has been smashed to gain entry.

2.4 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



2.4.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks slightly mid-week, but remains relatively consistent Tuesday to Sunday.

2.4.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk fluctuates – with the greatest risk during the early hours of the morning and during the late afternoon/early evening. Offenders frequently target vehicles at night when it is dark, streets tend to be quieter and they perceive a lower risk of being observed and identified.

2.4.3 Vehicles parked within open, communal areas or on street, where they are easily accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners, are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked on the driveways of individual properties or within secure garages/parking facilities.

2.5 General Risk Factors

2.5.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Bogue callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Anti-social behaviour
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Neighbour disputes
- Poor maintenance of access control systems
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.6 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.6.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting local residential properties and parked vehicles are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Doors have been targeted most frequently and have either been forced open with implements/bodily pressure, or have been targeted when left insecure by residents (particularly front doors)

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.

All individual bedrooms should also be secured with a robust entrance doorset (see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.

- There have been a number of incidents where the means of entry was unknown/legitimate – this is likely to have been when offenders have targeted insecure doors or windows unnoticed or have tailgated/posed as legitimate visitors to gain access to apartment blocks

Possible Solution - A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to the building before allowing them access (see Section 4.1). The main communal entrance should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. Consideration could also be given to 'airlock' lobby system, which features a secondary entrance door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed.

- Windows have been prised open by offenders to gain entry

Possible Solutions - All ground floor/accessible windows should also be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.2), with key operated locks and opening restrictors.

All private spaces to the sides/rear of the building should be robustly enclosed, particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible space, to deter unauthorised access. Clearly defined defensible space between the building frontage and the 'street' can a degree of separation between public and semi-private space and act as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are more likely to feel under observation/scrutiny from the street or overlooking properties. Such boundary definitions can also reduce the risk of criminal damage and nuisance/anti-social behaviour.

- Glazing within doors (particularly to the rear of properties) and windows has been smashed to gain entry

Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Any glazed panels in or around doors should ideally be small and set well-away from locking points.

- Vehicles have been targeted for theft from, theft of and criminal damage particularly when parked on-street or within open car parks

Possible Solution - It is essential that the development is designed so that any resident's vehicles are secured and overlooked. Ideally, any communal parking areas serving buildings should be located directly in front of the dwellings they serve, clearly separated from the street or any areas of adjacent open space/pedestrian routes. Any side, rear, undercroft or basement communal parking areas must be secured with automatic gates/shutters to prevent unauthorised access to where hidden doors, windows and parked vehicles could be attacked unseen.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development is to convert and extend the existing HMO to provide 25 no. bedrooms, with associated car parking, bin storage and landscaping.
- 3.1.2 There is a part single, part two-storey wrap around side/rear extension proposed to both properties, but the separation of the existing properties will remain. They will be served by 3 no. parking bays to the north of No. 220 Wellington Road South (accessed off Lyme Grove) and 14 no. parking bays to the south of No. 222 Wellington Road South (accessed off Lowfield Road). The parking area to the north will also include a bin store and the parking area to the south will include a cycle store for 25 no. bicycles.
- 3.1.3 No. 220 Wellington Road South will be served by two communal entrances - one fronting onto Wellington Road South and one off the parking area to the side of the property. The basement will include storage areas and the ground floor will house a communal lounge/dining room, a communal kitchen and 5 no. ensuite bedrooms. The first floor will house 5 no. ensuite bedrooms, with an additional 2 no. ensuite bedrooms within the loft space.
- 3.1.4 No. 222 Wellington Road South will also be served by two communal entrances – one fronting onto Wellington Road South and one off the parking area to the side of the property. The basement will include storage areas and the ground floor will house a communal kitchen and 5 no. en-suite bedrooms. The first floor will house 6 no. ensuite bedrooms, with an additional 2 no. ensuite bedrooms within the loft space.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will bring activity, overlooking and surveillance to the area at all times of the day and night.
- 3.2.1 There will be 12 bedrooms with No. 220 and 13 bedrooms within No. 222, which is considered to be sufficient to provide a reasonable prospect of a presence of residents throughout the day and at the weekend, providing activity and passive supervision within the development, which can help to deter offenders from targeting the properties. Alternatively, too many bedrooms within HMO properties can increase the likelihood of residents not knowing the other occupants and any visitors coming to the building, which could provide opportunities that offenders could exploit.
- 3.2.2 Access controls can easily be deployed at the communal entrance doors to each property, in order to restrict access to residents and authorised visitors.
- 3.2.3 The communal space within the properties can help build relationships between residents and develop 'social capital' within a development. There is often a more 'stable' resident base in socially cohesive developments, that is, there is less of a turnover of residents. HMOs with a high turnover of residents can often lead to crime and disorder issues.
- 3.2.4 Secure cycle and bin storage enclosures will be located within the parking areas serving each of the properties.
- 3.2.5 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design/ construction of the scheme. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design/specification of the development can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The existing low walls along the street frontages of the site should be retained, to provide defensible space to the ground floor residential windows and definition to the residential parking areas. The existing dense vegetation/mature trees along the street frontages of the properties and parking areas (particularly along Lowfield Road and Wellington Street South) somewhat impede views of and from them and create hidden areas where offenders could attack partially hidden doors, windows or parked vehicles unseen. It is highly recommended that any existing shrubbery/hedging along the street frontages is lowered to an approximate maximum height of 1000mm and any existing tree canopies are raised above an approximate height of 2000mm, in order to maximise surveillance opportunities (ensuring all parked vehicles, entrance doors/windows and all residents/visitors coming to and from the properties can be clearly seen from the street) and eliminating hiding places that could be exploited by offenders. The communal entrances and parking areas serving the properties must be well-lit (see Section 4.4) and, given how busy the area is for on-street parking, there should be clear signage to indicate the parking areas are for the use of residents only. There should be a symbolic barrier to the vehicular access points off Lowfield Road and Lyme Grove (e.g. defined by brick pillars and a change of road surface texture/colour) to encourage a feeling of territoriality among the residents, psychologically giving the impression that the area beyond is private and discouraging anyone without a legitimate purpose from entering.
- 3.3.2 The main communal entrance to each property should be that which fronts onto Wellington Road South, where surveillance opportunities are maximised and visitors do not have to enter/cross resident parking areas. The side entrances to each property should be for the use of residents only, to gain access to/from the parking areas (see Section 4.1 for more information). Given the high crime levels in the area (see Section 2), it is considered essential that the communal main entrances to each property are security-certified, self-closing/locking and fitted with secure access controls to allow residents to control access. In addition to a robust access control system for visitors, there should also be a secure system for the delivery of post that ensures access to the building is not required (again, see Section 4.1). The communal doors to the side of each property (off the parking areas) should also be security-certified, self-closing/locking and for the use of residents only.
- 3.3.3 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the proposed scope of works. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in staff, residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

It is highly recommended that the following physical security measures are incorporated into the proposed scope of works.

4.1 Doors & Access Controls

- The external doorsets to each property (including main communal entrances off Wellington Road South and the side communal entrances off the resident parking areas) should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2.
- The main communal entrance to each property should be compliant with and certified to one of the standards above, including a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. It should be self-closing/locking and capable of being controlled by means of an audio/video entry phone system linked to each bedroom, so that residents can vet callers to the building before allowing them access. There should also be a secure system for the delivery of post without needing to provide access to each building. Postboxes should be located externally adjacent to the main entrances. The postboxes themselves should be certified to Door & Hardware Federation Technical Specification 009 (TS 009), with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). All other deliveries should be made directly to the residents via the access control system.
- The communal entrances to the side of each property should be for the use of residents only. They should also be security-certified to one of the above standards, self-closing/locking and operated by resident key/key-fob only.
- The internal doorsets to each of the bedroom units should be of robust construction (FD30 or higher), with hinge-bolts and a lock certified to BS 8621 or PAS 8621, to allow the residents to secure their own bedroom/possessions.
- Given the likely transient nature of the residents of the scheme, any resident fob/key-cards should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled by the landlord to ensure that mis-use is prevented. Any keys should be collected by the landlord (and accounted for at all times) when residents move on.

4.2 Windows

- All new ground floor windows or first floor windows potentially accessible from single-storey elements should be certificated to BS PAS 24.
- If any existing windows are to be retained, consideration should be given to internal secondary glazing units certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR1 (e.g. <http://www.selectaglaze.co.uk/benefits/security-secondary-glazing>), which should incorporate laminated glazing (see below).
- All new and any retained ground floor and first floor opening lights accessible from single-storey elements (escape requirements permitting) should be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- All new ground floor and potentially accessible first floor glazing (to doors and windows) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Lighting

- Lighting to all parking areas should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 10, with a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

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- Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED, metal halide or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
 - Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.5 Parking Areas & Cycle/Bin Stores

- The surface of the parking areas should be even tarmac. The integrity of the surface treatment should be maintained to ensure that there is no loose material that can be used to commit crime.
- Bays and any directional markings should be clearly demarcated to avoid confusion/conflict and aid surveillance.
- The proposed cycle and bin stores should be located where surveillance opportunities are maximised over them, but where they do not form climbing aids over adjacent boundary treatments or onto the roof of single-storey building elements.
- It is highly recommended that cycle stores or lockers are sourced from an SBD supplier - please see [Accredited Product Search \(securedbydesign.com\)](https://www.securedbydesign.com). If not, they should ideally be of steel-framed construction, with welded-wire mesh panels/roofs and lockable gates (with no exposed hinges or large sliding bolt apertures that could form a climbing aid). If the proposed cycle stores are to be of timber construction, they must have a concrete foundation, minimum 38x50mm planed timber frame; floor and roof constructed from minimum 11mm boards; and minimum 11x125mm tongue & grooved board walls and door. The doors should have coach-bolted hinges and hasp and stables/padlocks to meet Sold Secure Silver standard. The cycle stores should include 'Sheffield' style racks, or similar, that allow residents to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand, rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: www.designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/.
- The proposed bin store should be similarly enclosed and securely gated to prevent unauthorised theft, mis-use and arson. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place while retaining a secure development.

4.6 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an *acceptable standard* that will allow for *identification* of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are *overview* and *recognition*, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

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- The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [all external doorsets](#) and [all vehicle/cycle parking areas](#).

4.7 Landscaping

- In vulnerable locations such as around entrances, parking areas and street frontage, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the HMO scheme must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the properties. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All residents should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations to the landlord/facilities management team.
- 5.1.2 The upkeep of a residential development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter/graffiti removal
 - Repair to communal areas (e.g. boundary treatments, lighting, access controls, signage etc.)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.3 Any amenity areas should be subject to an effective maintenance contract, to ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
31 st January 2024	Paul Butler Associates	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
31 st January 2024	Paul Butler Associates	Quote issued
2 nd February 2024	Paul Butler Associates	Confirmation of instruction & fee
26 th February 2024	Paul Butler Associates	Email sent re: report completion & payment
29 th February 2024	Paul Butler Associates	Email received re: payment
29 th February 2024	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
A1506(01)AP001	Proposed Site Plan & 3D Views	30/01/24	P2
A1506(01)AP003	Proposed Ground Floor Plan	30/01/24	P2
A1506(02)AP002	Proposed Basement	29/01/24	P1
A1506(02)AP003	Proposed First Floor Plan	29/01/24	P1
A1506(02)AP005	Proposed Loft Floor Plan	29/01/24	P1
A1506(02)AP006	Proposed Elevations	29/01/24	P1
A1506(02)AP007	Proposed Elevations	29/01/24	P1

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing
- b) Performance of hardware
- c) Resistance to static loading
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk